Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

761.93/8–2349

Statement for the Press by Dr. Kan Chieh-hou, Personal Representative of Acting President Li Tsung-jen⁷¹

undated

As the personal representative of Acting President Li Tsung-jen, I feel it necessary to correct a misunderstanding regarding President Li’s foreign policy as related in the State Department’s White Paper on U.S. Relations with China.

In that section of the White Paper entitled, “The Position and Policies of Acting President Li,” on page 293, the following statement is made:

“On January 23 (1949), a representative of the Acting President called on Ambassador Stuart to request a public statement of support from the United States. This representative said that General Li had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy and had worked out a tentative three-point draft agreement between China and the Soviet Union which the (Soviet) Ambassador⁷² had taken with him to Moscow a few days earlier. The three points were: (1) strict Chinese neutrality in any future international conflict; (2) the elimination of American influence to as great an extent as possible in China; (3) the establishment of a basis of real cooperation between China and Russia. General Li had agreed to these three points in principle and felt that his hand would be strengthened in negotiating on them if he had a statement of American support.…”⁷³

I am compelled to point out, at the outset, that if the three conditions laid down by the Soviet Union had already been agreed to, there would have been no need to appeal to the American government for a statement of support to strengthen the Chinese hand “in negotiating on them.” Furthermore, if Acting President Li had actually intended to eliminate American influence from China, he would not have kept the American Ambassador informed of such negotiations. The very fact of asking for a statement of support from the United States demonstrates his recognition of the importance of American influence in China.

In order to clarify this misunderstanding, I will herewith narrate the background data relating to all these negotiations.

Efforts aimed at an agreement under which the Soviet government would exercise its influence to halt Chinese Communists in their territorial expansion, were begun by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1945. At the end of that year the Generalissimo’s son, who was then in Moscow, was told by Stalin that, before he could give his support to the Chinese government, a treaty of neutrality must be concluded between China and the Soviet Union, and a coalition government must be formed in China with the participation of the Chinese Communists. The Chinese government did not accept those terms.

The following year—1946—Generalissimo Chiang made it known to the Soviet Ambassador in Nanking that he was ready to reconsider the Stalin proposals and, when Stalin instructed the Soviet Ambassador to invite him to visit Moscow, he hold the Soviet Ambassador that he was unable to make the trip. Stalin was so furious that he gave instructions to all the Soviet diplomatic and consular officers in China to adopt a policy of non-cooperation in their relations with the Chinese government.

The foregoing information was laid before me by the Soviet ambassador to China when, immediately upon General Li’s accession to the presidency, I was instructed to sound out the Soviet Union on prospects of exercising its influence to get the Chinese Communists to agree to a reasonable settlement under which they would halt their southward drive.

It became altogether clear from the conversations that what the Soviet Union had really wanted in the past three years was a guarantee that China would remain neutral in case Russia became involved in any way. It was equally clear that, following failure in obtaining a neutrality agreement from the Chinese government, the Russians gave a go-ahead signal to the Chinese Communists with the hope that a Communist controlled China would give them this guarantee.

Faced with the alternatives of continued Communist aggression or a neutrality treaty, Acting President Li ordered me to discuss with the American Ambassador, Dr. Leighton Stuart, the matter of offering the Soviet Union a neutrality treaty on condition that the Communist aggression be halted. I saw Dr. Leighton Stuart⁷⁴ and also the military and naval attachés of the American Embassy. In view of no possibility of immediate aid from the United States and the need of time for reorganizing our armed forces after our setback around Hsuchow, they had no objection to this policy of delaying the Communist offensive.

I then proceeded to take the matter up with the Soviet ambassador. With the repeated military success of the Chinese Communists, the Soviet price had been raised. He would not be satisfied with a treaty of neutrality. He insisted on the establishment of a basis of real cooperation between China and Russia. As an evidence of sincerity, he proposed that the Chinese government eliminate American influence to as great an extent as possible in China.

I protested that China could not give up her traditional friendship with the United States and that we needed such material aid and technical assistance to develop our industries and natural resources as the Soviet Union would never be able to give. He bluntly replied that further negotiation was conditioned on the acceptance of this proposal.

It was at this point that Acting President Li sent me to the American Ambassador to ask for a statement of support⁷⁵ to strengthen our hand in the negotiation with a view to obtaining Russian instruction to the Chinese Communists to come to a reasonable settlement. At no time did Acting President Li agree to the proposed establishment of a basis of real cooperation between China and Russia or the elimination of American influence to as great an extent as possible in China. Nor had the Soviet Ambassador “taken with him to Moscow” any “tentative three-point draft agreement between China and the Soviet Union”, as the Soviet Ambassador did not leave China until three or four months after the negotiations had been broken off.

A few days after my conversation with Ambassador Stuart on the subject of a statement of support, the hostile attitude of the Soviet Ambassador towards the Chinese government was so evident that I did not try to see him again. The subsequent removal of the Soviet Embassy from Nanking to Canton put a complete end to this matter.

71. Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Dr. Kan in his letter of August 23, not printed; statement released for morning papers of August 24.
72. N. V. Roschin.
73. Omission indicated in the source text.
74. See telegram No. 197, January 23, 11 a. m., from the Ambassador in China, vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter II.
75. See telegram No. 768, April 15, 11 a. m., from the Ambassador in China, vol. viii, ibid., chapter III.