893.00/7–2949: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 29—2:59 p. m.]
1263. ReDeptel 490, July 27. International political situation worse for Communists generally due failure re Berlin,38 re Atlantic Pact.39 Overall political situation therefore worse for Chinese Communists who could have been right in following virulent anti-American line past 3 years only if war near when they thought, to win if USSR won but not lose if USSR lost. USSR has used them as pawns and may still advise Soviet war imminent (see Contel Nanking [garbled group]) but Communists may now suspect international political game going badly. I believe this probable. Note Lo Lung-chi’s leading questions (see Contel 1195, July 19 [20])40.
Economically Communists were wrong from beginning in attempting too much. Economic situation steadily deteriorating, grave shortages both food and industrial materials can be expected develop before 1950 harvest with resultant famine industrial breakdown. Economic failure would weaken Communist political authority, reduce China’s usefulness to USSR.
In present circumstances Communists could logically be expected withdraw somewhat from extreme anti-foreign position originally taken. Such retreat quite fitting in Communists’ own logic, hampered only by natural reluctance admit errors even implicitly, innate Chinese [Page 806] xenophobia, stupidity in lower party command, these Communists who sought cheap victories in international field now face necessity trying repair damage done good relations. They probably now appreciate significance of their plans of absence Sino-Japanese trade, closure Mukden Consulate, of Embassy’s warning to Americans, reduction missionary funds. Finally Lo Lung-chi’s attempt make it appear Mao Tse-tung is powerful and would lash back if baited, Communist line unpopular with many intellectuals and with increasing economic distress shows signs becoming more unpopular with masses.
Note inconclusive but possibly significant sign Communist change tactics. Since July 7 there has been notable lightening of anti-USA press attacks. Recently even such items US printed have in greater proportion than before been reprints from Soviet press. Also about July 21, there was perceptible change in attitude Bureau Public Safety in direction greater ease, more courtesy, less argument connected with application consular officials for registration with regard questioning, acceptance, notations reference to consular occupation titles, presumably by directive. Soviet regrets expressed French and Belgians regarding social non-attendance (Contel 1237, July 2541) of possible parallel significance.
In view all circumstances would myself recommend following approach: Assuredly take advantage Ambassador’s departure make démarche vis-à-vis Communists but refrain from playing all cards at once or giving hand away in advance, undertaking now only limited objective as major Communist shift hardly to be achieved one blow however heavy and better got through series lighter but wearing blows. Would draft aide-mémoire on following lines: Note outstanding cases violation rights person, residence, trade, missionary effort, travel of American officials and citizens as established by treaty and international law and practice, but omitting question whether Communists aim make diplomatic position untenable; omit also threatened closure Consulates but inform Communists that in existing circumstances Ambassador will not return at this time and US Government will mould its future policies regarding its representatives, nationals and interests in Communist China according to actual developments under Communist administration; give essence first two paragraphs message projected Deptel 367, June 14,42 stiffening it somewhat and particularly in second paragraph changing “hope” to “had expected” (recommend for psychological reasons Ambassador give no indication aide-mémoire incorporates any part of message intended for Chou En-lai) and referring to significance USIS work for development understanding between two nations; and conclude [Page 807] with short statement to effect USA will judge Communist “bona fides by actions not words and be guided accordingly.
After departure Ambassador and after having given message time sink in, Department could then, insofar as administratively and politically desirable, undertake progressive reduction Nanking establishment to point consonant with current demands on it, using at least some personnel to strengthen other China posts if Communist policies permit their profitable functioning.
Believe this approach gives full flexibility to USA for actions designed to meet developments in fluid situation, including making ready for time when Communists have organized central government and put selves in position “accept” recognition, and at same time keeps Communists in dark as to American intentions. As indicated Contel 296 [769?], May 12,43 this desirable.
- This reference is to the Berlin airlift operation when the western sector was closed off from western Germany.↩
- North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington, April 4, 1949; Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1964, or 03 Stat. (pt. 2) 2241.↩
- Ante, p. 443.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Ante, p. 384.↩
- Not printed.↩