898.00/1–2549: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 25—5:55 a. m.]
203. Supreme Headquarters report 7 of 8 Communist columns within 15-to 20-mile radius Pukow, moving toward that city. Only one inferior Nationalist Army remains on north bank Yangtze in Pukow vicinity and this army not expected fight. Within past 2 days 2 Nationalist Armies have crossed river moving through Nanking to undisclosed destination. Present composition Nanking Garrison unknown but it is believed that Generalissimo’s elite guard has departed for Shanghai for onward movement elsewhere.
On political front Li Tsung-jen trying form bloc anti-Generalissimo elements and opportunists. It is reported that as enticement he and supporters are claiming American support on condition he form effective government. At same time, we understand he is attempting try secure Soviet intervention prevent Communists crossing Yangtze, informing Soviets that America will intervene substantially should crossing take place and also telling them that China will be neutral in event Soviet-American war.
On peace front Li is prepared accept Mao Tse-tung’s50 eight points51 in principle and negotiate on details with negotiations prefaced by cease fire mission. Although negotiators chosen, no formal approach to Communists yet made. Up to present Communist radio tends scorn Li’s peace attempts, labeling Generalissimo’s retirement and Li’s moves as “American plot.”
[Page 80]While Communist military intentions unknown, it would appear likely they have capability to take the capital within coming week. On basis present information, it is difficult foretell whether they have intention exercising this capability. In any event, should they choose accept Government’s offer negotiate, their presence in overwhelming force on north bank river close proximity Nanking will give them bargaining position for [far] above that which Li can obtain through present political maneuverings. Indeed, there is little prospect Li can do other than accept Communist terms, however onerous, or move [to] Kwangsi.
Either these eventualities, we believe Generalissimo can be expected re-enter scene. Through his departure, he effectively cut his loss—military and political—in lower Yangtze valley. With secure well-defended base on Taiwan and relieved of responsibilities for forthcoming military debacle for surrender Government forces Nanking–Shanghai area, if negotiations succeed, which only possible if Government accepts Communist dictated terms, he can reject agreement as “national betrayal” and continue resistance from Taiwan and such areas on mainland where he may retain control. If negotiations fail, and Li thus discredited, Generalissimo can then come forth attempt rally and lead all resistance forces.
In conclusion, it would appear that Communist control lower Yangtze valley, whether by military or political means, shortly forthcoming. However, resistance will undoubtedly continue elsewhere China under Generalissimo’s leadership.
Although Communists have military means occupy South China, this may prove time-consuming operation, especially since Generalissimo’s military [re]sources probably commensurate with limited task holding Taiwan–Foochow–Amoy triangle, and delaying Communist advance into Kwangtung.