123 Stuart, J. Leighton
Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff ( Kennan )67
Walt68 is very anxious that you see the underlying message from Stuart.69 It strikes me as being extremely significant—even more so than the démarche made by Chou.70 (It may even be an explanation of why Chou turned down the approach from Clubb through an intermediary.)
Obviously, the Communists would try to make as much capital as they could out of such a visit. All of the objections raised in the message are valid.
The utility of the visit to my mind is less what Stuart would learn—which would probably be a great deal—than what he could under our instructions tell the Communists. And that should be plenty. He should give them a curtain lecture in even stronger terms than that presented by Bedell Smith71 to Stalin.72
What worries Walt most is the domestic reaction in this country to such a move. And that reaction could be violent. Walt’s formula is that Stuart should accept only on the basis that he will fly in his own plane to Mukden to (a) make sure that all facilities were made available for the departure of the staff there and (b) bring Mr. and Mrs. Ward73 back in his plane, stopping off at Peiping en route to see Mao and Chou. Walt feels, and I think rightly, that this would make a lot of face for us in Asia and that it would be a justification in the eyes of the American public for the visit.
The hooker in this is that such terms might well be quite unacceptable to the Communists and the opportunity for conversations would be lost by making it contingent upon such terms.
It seems to me that the problem of American public criticism could be met in a large measure by a statement which would be issued by the Department following the conversations in which we would make clear that Stuart had not gone to Peiping to play footy-footy with the Communists but had gone there, as would be the fact, to read them the riot act.
[Page 769]Walt’s position is that the ultimate decision turns on an estimate of American domestic reaction and that that is a factor which he is not competent to judge. It must be weighed by the Secretary and a decision made by him.
- Notation by Mr. Kennan for the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk): “7/1/49–Mr. Rusk—Dean–Since I am leaving this afternoon thought you might like to see this. G.F.K.” Notation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Freeman): “Shown to the Secretary 7/1/49 by Mr. Rusk.” Notation by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth): “Absent from Dept 7/1/49 seen 7/5/49 WWB”.↩
- W. Walton Butterworth.↩
- Telegram No. 1410, June 30,supra.↩
- For documentation, see pp. 357 ff.↩
- Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1946–49.↩
- Marshal Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, Soviet Prime Minister and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.↩
- Angus Ward, Consul General at Mukden.↩