893.01/5–1849: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 18—6:53 p. m.]
Cantel 404. Despite continuing efforts both, sides, there remains little or no likelihood Generalissimo and Li Tsung-jen factions can compose their differences to point where Nationalist China will again have effective functioning government. Mutual distrust is too deep-seated to permit unified action and everyone seems to be going around in circles.
It now appears that Li plans move Government Chungking when Canton becomes untenable. Many Government functionaries in lower levels have been refusing come Canton from Shanghai and there is increasing evidence that lower echelons in Government circles will remain Canton, come what may; thus only ranking officials would proceed Chungking. From Chungking Li will attempt continue resistance based on southwest.
In view Communist superior military potential, length tenure this transplanted administration is almost wholly at pleasure Communist military leaders. Li himself is well aware insecurity his position and is even better aware comparative security Generalissimo faction with its control Taiwan. Both groups appreciate defensive value Formosa Strait and both believe that our strategic requirements will compel us keep Taiwan in hands non-Communists’ administration.
While Li continues efforts organize resistance in hope of establishing bargaining position with Communists, his basic concern appears to be question of ultimate leadership of anti-Communist resistance movement which will have some hope, however remote, of forming successor government to forthcoming Communist regime. He greatly fears that when this time comes Generalissimo and his followers will be firmly entrenched Taiwan under our protection while he and his followers will be dispersed group political refugees.
These factors should, we believe, be taken into account in making decision re character our future diplomatic representation Nationalist China. To follow to new interior capital when Li leaves Canton would do much convince him our genuine concern for success his efforts and allay his present fears that we regard Generalissimo and his followers as legal, logical and desirable political heirs non-Communist China. However, in our judgment, this advantage would be out-weighted by fact that appearance of support of Li such mission would inevitably give would serve as occasion for requests for more tangible [Page 690] evidence in terms of material aid of our desire that Li succeed. Our failure respond favorably such requests would improvement Li’s morale resulting from dispatching mission in first instance. Also, military capabilities seem guarantee that Li’s efforts resistance southwest may be short-lived at best. To encourage him, however tacitly, attempt course action for which he lacks capabilities will be in long run to gain his ill-will. Finally, transplanted Government will be no more than administrative façade and doubtless will be forced flee again at will Communists so that our continued close association with it might develop comic aspects. For these reasons it seems to us difficult to perceive developments that would warrant planning for OffEmb accompanying Government when it leaves for interior.
There is another aspect, however. When Li moves west it seems evident considerable portion those at present supporting regime will choose security under Generalissimo [on] Taiwan and that others will seek safety Hong Kong, Macao or elsewhere. It is entirely possible, though we believe unlikely, that Generalissimo may choose resume presidency at time Li Tsung-jen leaves Canton, or he may bide his time until Li is forced from his new capital in Chungking and then resume authority. Even though Generalissimo should emerge when Canton falls, we think it would be great mistake for mission proceed Taiwan. To do so would not only have disastrous effect on Li faction, but would confirm Generalissimo and followers in conviction circumstances forced us protect and preserve them against any contingency and despite their own shortcomings.
In this situation it appears at this stage that our best policy would be to close Embassy office Canton when Government leaves this city and that whatever further relations are maintained with Nationalist Government or its constituent parts be carried out through appropriate consular officers. Final decision must of necessity await the event, but we felt the above views might help the Department in its planning.
Sent Department Cantel 404; repeated Nanking 296, Shanghai 250.