893.00B/12–2349: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 24—9:13 a. m.]
2341. Comment as follows re travel Mao Tze-tung Moscow, reEmbtel 3135, Moscow 23, December 18.
Mao’s departure was untold China in advance. Unclear whether he and Roschin departed in company. Names accompanying staff ungiven in full. In short, travel undertaken in high degree local security.
… told me today Mao accompanied by large staff including Chu Teh and wife Chi Chao-ting, others unknown. Mao will discuss Moscow signature treaty, draft of which brought here by Roschin. Treaty comprises three sections: Military, economic and trading.… unable make detailed inquiry but thought military section covered training Chinese troops, trading would be along lines usual barter agreements between USSR and satellites, accorded suggestion economic section might provide for Soviet participation Chinese enterprises (re Sinkiang pattern).… now opined, reContel 2320, December 20,37 figure one million for troops China required provide in case war too small, three million might be nearer.
Mao desires obtain in Moscow, if possible, (1) return all Manchuria and particularly Dairen to control China, and (2) loan 300 million but in what currency unclear to . . . . Expects in return be called on give quid pro quo comprising particularly employment additional Soviet advisors in railroad, transportation, communications, military organization, [Page 644] “municipal planning”. (Presumably this is Chinese estimate of least to be demanded of them.)
… said Soviet tactics clear to see. They desired maintain breach between China and USA at least until they could tie China in Soviet camp by deal along lines USSR–Bulgar treaty, but China however felt need for closer relations with US for both economic and political reasons.
Comment: Believe … main contact for above probably Chi Chao-ting. Motives either or both perhaps open to question but if there be some emphasis on dark aspects situation this is essentially problem for Communist purpose speeding American recognition and thus getting (1) American counterbalance to Soviet machinations, and (2) American economic aid (see later message).
To me seems unlikely Soviets would consent to replacement 1945 treaty prior to legal determination end war with Japan, more probable that it would be supplemented by another act along lines USSR–Mongolia treaty 193638 or, as … suggests, USSR satellite. If as per Contel 2320, December 20, there already is “verbal agreement”, treaty covering all China would be simply expansion formalization Communist accord already existing in prototype. It would probably go farther than foreseen by.…
Some clauses such agreement, however, would probably be kept secret. Note particularly re Contel 2300, December 1739 that West Manchuria now has status which would facilitate its incorporation in visible future into Mongolian People’s Republic. Current reports indicate that parts of China and Suiyuan will also be demarcated at [as?] “Inner Mongolia” but whether as part “Inner Mongolia” this would, of course, make possible still greater accretion territory to MPR, and Inner Mongolian cordon like MPR itself would then connect on west with politically unstable Sinkiang where there can logically be expected renewal Soviet expansion along 1933–42 lines.
Mao would naturally desire expansion Sino-Soviet trade which to date falling short expectations. Diversion trade from old channels to new proving more difficult than first thought. Note report that Soviets demanded Chinese 5–year plan for purpose coordination trade needs and when Chinese said best they could do was plan 2 years ahead Soviets said nothing doing without 5-year plan. Experience seems support belief that in China as in Sinkiang and Manchuria Soviets may try get Soviet participation in certain Chinese enterprises with aim getting eventual control.
In sum probabilities seem be developments Moscow will follow lines contrary both Chinese amour-propre and self-interest. Mao, as [Page 645] most Chinese, deeply nationalistic. Communist adulation “great leader Stalin” goes against grain many otherwise strong supporters Chinese Communist regime. It would go even more against Chinese grain for them because give up territory and rights traditionally regarded as Chinese. Mao knows this.
In circumstances it could logically be expected Mao might return from Moscow somewhat beaten down, perhaps somewhat disillusioned. This not to suggest he would be on verge Titoism: Soviets undoubtedly have ever in mind example 1927 and are steeled check any such development ruthlessly. They hold stick over Chinese by being able threaten “separatist movement” Manchuria, and location capital Peiping with main Chinese forces far away in south makes quite feasible Soviet brandishing big stick. Chinese have always preferred others do their fighting with big powers, but non-Soviet friends presently unavailable. In theory Mao might with decision and vigor now react as Tito against USSR but in fact developments too unlikely. Also unlikely in view Communist discipline and strict surveillance personnel there will yet occur any major split in military ranks with some leader exploiting national misery in coup against Mao’s leadership. Nevertheless it is not to be thought impossible that Mao and his government should try draw somewhat away from USSR along lines perhaps foreshadowed Contel 917, June l.40 Peiping regime can now presumably look forward with reasonable assurance to recognition by certain non-Soviet states near future, which may seem to them to offer opportunity maintain measure of independence from Soviet octopus. Nationalistic Chinese Communist elements might now feel urge resume fence-straddling in world politics. Modern experience seems show they could hardly hold their precarious balance in that position under Soviet attack, and would probably be forced in time make sterner choice.
[To] Moscow at Department’s discretion.
Sent Department 2341, Department pass AmPolAd41 Tokyo.