893.003/12–2149: Telegram
The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 21—6:28 a. m.]
5330. 1. Trusted American exceptionally well posted on Peiping Communist developments has given officer ConGen following information as coming from high official of Chinese Communist regime:
Liu Shao-chi and Kao Kang30 preceded Mao to Moscow for preliminary talks to stage-set Mao’s visit. Mao left for Moscow following Liu’s return Peiping. (Not known whether Kao Kang has yet returned to Peiping or Manchuria.)
[Page 640]Chou En-lai will probably leave Peiping very soon—our source’s inference being that Chou has been alerted to be ready proceed Moscow to handle routine drafting and other details for Soviet-Chinese Communist agreements as soon as basic terms settled.
Chen Shu-tung, non-Communist Shanghai industrialist who has enjoyed Mao’s favor [and] confidence, opposed Mao’s going Moscow and Mao answered him in letter explaining necessity for trip. (American source lacked information whether other high government officials had voiced opposition.)
Comment: Advance sending of Liu and Kao would seem suggest that most difficult points have already been settled through them sufficiently to ensure strong probability that Stalin–Mao agreement will be quickly reached.
Choice of Liu as pathmaker (presumably the most difficult and responsible task) and Chou as follow-up routine man would seem reflect (a) Moscow’s preference for Liu and/or (b) Liu’s higher rank and influence in CCP.
Selection Kao Kang strengthens logical surmise that Manchuria plays extremely important part in discussions.
2. Liu Hua-jui (now assisting ECA31 disposal plans), who is astute, well-informed observer, gives us following explanation:
While Mao’s visit Moscow was to be expected, indications are that his decision for trip this particular juncture came as result strong and rather sudden Moscow pressure; that Moscow was dissatisfied with Chinese Communist performance and their manifestations of loyalty; and that timing of visit was related to British and other western nation “moves” toward recognition “including perhaps even Jessup’s trip to Far East”,32 and to Kremlin’s desire to “nail down” its objectives while Chinese Communists still manageable and before Soviet position weakened by development of western influence and anti-Russian trends in Chinese Communist regime.
3. Han Ming in talk with officer ConGen today expressed similar views. Said that Mao’s trip would probably have awaited some “climaxing” event such as Chinese Communist conquest of Taiwan, but that Moscow’s dissatisfaction with Chinese Communists and signs of early western relations with new regime caused sudden Soviet insistence on immediate visit. Han believes Moscow has “put strong heat” on Mao.
4. As also of interest in above connection may be mentioned that officer ConGen was told yesterday by local Swedish Consular official that a Swedish newspaper recently carried article reporting Molotov [Page 641] having completed 2-month visit in Manchuria. (Rumors current here some time ago also had Molotov in Manchuria.) Should Dept lack text this article, ConGen will seek further details.
Sent Dept, Dept pass Moscow 20, Peiping 533.