711.93/9–2749: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 28—8:48 a. m.]
1619. Was informed September 24 by L. K. Tao,73 known to Ambassador Stuart,74 he had recently met with Lo Lung-chi75 who had conversation September 20 with Mao Tse-tung. Mao told Lo, re Sino-American relations, USA would have to choose finally between maintenance relations with Kmt Government or establishing relations with new government Peiping, Lo considered Mao’s attitude regarding general question Sino-American relations moderate, that Mao realist, not Communist extremist, said it could not be expected CCP in view recent relations could change quickly its attitude toward USA.
Per Tao, Lo himself presented no ideas to Mao regarding matter in point. Lo stated (presumably for transmittal myself) that he realized it was not to be expected USA could break off relations with Nationalists at once but he offered following ideas: [Page 538]
- 1.
- USA should discontinue aid in arms and material to Chungking Government “as proposed by MacArthur”,76
- 2.
- Even after break with Chungking it could not be expected American relations with CCP Government would for next year or two be as close as Soviet relations same government.
Tao brought forward, as if his own idea, concept that it might prove possible with establishment new government effect changes regarding foreign policy. I agreed this technically possible, noting establishment of government on “coalition” basis facilitated such policy shifts “in line with majority will” if desired.
Tao quoted Lo as saying Mao “unable accept American aid” which acceptance would arouse Soviet suspicion. I asked what kind of aid Lo had in mind and Tao replied this signified “economic cooperation”. I said economic cooperation was proposed under President Truman’s Point 4 program.77 He went on to say however that Lo thought it good idea if USA could extend certain relief as to present famine refugees without however attaching any conditions whatsoever including any regarding American control. I informed Tao that it seemed to me hardly likely American Congress would propose relief when Communists have stigmatized such relief as “imperialistic manipulations” as in Peiping library exhibit (Contel 1607, September 2478 and see telegram now in preparation) and Communist press continued daily attacks on USA and allies’ works. I said that if CCP side itself however desired make request for aid, supplying data regarding numbers affected, etc., I would pass request on. Tao asked whether it would be satisfactory if request came from Chinese individuals. I opined such move would be pointless, for reasons indicated previously and because Communists would have to have cognizance of matter and USA could hardly be expected endeavor smuggle in flour by shipload pretending they hoped Communists would not notice. Tao said question Communist face would be involved in any request from government, I remarked that that request for aid would have better chance success if it followed change of policy vis-à-vis USA which could of course technically be effected upon establishment new government along lines suggested by Tao himself. I reminded Tao that I was not making proposal, that matter was one for Chinese decision, that I could give no assurances, that I simply desired indicate regarding previous statement that I would not indicate door was shut in advance to any appeal for aid. I said adoption by government of more friendly attitude toward USA would naturally facilitate better trade and general relations. Tao said he proposed discuss matter with Lo.
[Page 539]Tao communicated also from Lo suggestion it would be helpful if Americans refrained from open announcement support Chinese democratic elements saying he, Lo, particularly felt he would have enjoyed more influential position in PCC had there not been statement regarding democratic individualism in Acheson letter,79 stated further there was to have been setup foreign relations committee headed by Chou En-lai with Lo and Chang Tung-Sun80 participating but that project had been abandoned after issuance White Paper.
Lo incidentally asked whether we could supply him with copy White Paper, but desired it not be sent him direct to avoid suspicion attaching.
Tao further communicated information that position Hong Kong (see Contel 1456, August 31) could presently be considered safe, it having been decided in PCC subcommittees (that is, by CCP) that all treaties signed before Kmt would be accepted while those signed after that period would be made subject study. I pointed out to Tao incongruity in view circumstances treaties by virtue of which China recovered extraterritorial rights in main were all signed after 1928.
Comment: Position Lo essentially same as that reported Contel 1195, July 19, re both Sino-American relations and American aid. His basic proposal is USA should not expect return for anything given. His proposal in (2) might even seem suggest USA should bear patiently with all Communist vilifications and restrictions for that period of time which may in Communist estimate remain before outbreak of war, while per his suggestion re relief USA would contribute gratis Communist cause. Lo seemed indulging himself in favorite Chinese pastime of eating cake but proposing have it too. Question recognition will be treated separately, but re question American aid point out here: (1) Lo speaks with even less authority than previously and not even himself thought to come around personally and make formal proposal but acted in way to permit him complete repudiation (see case Chou En-lai, Contel 1080, June 27), (2) Communists themselves publicly condemn acceptance American relief foodstuffs particularly, and (3) Communists have expressed full adherence USSR while taking all steps possible root out from China so-called “American–UK imperialistic influences” which in their minds seems include all American influence. That Lo set forth his position right after meeting with Mao may indicate Mao okeh. I maintain strongly convictions set for[th in] tel 1427, August 25,81 and again would recommend as once before regarding Lo in Conreftel July 19 that his unauthoritative suggestions be disregarded.
[Page 540]Remark in passing that though true Lo has been by-passed at PCC in favor septuagenarian Shen Chun-ju this seems be quite in line with Communist policy putting forward to speak second-party persons who are completely subservient to Communist line (and it has been reported that Lo has spoken to Communists in favor of policy maintaining good relations with other powers than USSR), and that Chinese Communists obviously follow usual Communist policy of pursuing their objectives, using any excuses which might come to hand—or inventing them if unavailable.
- Known also as Tao Meng-huo, director of the Institute of Social Sciences (Academia Sinica).↩
- Dr. John Leighton Stuart returned home on leave early in August from Nanking; for further documentation, see pp. 723 ff.↩
- Leader of the Democratic League.↩
- General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP).↩
- Technical assistance plan proposed by President Truman in his inaugural address, January 20, 1949, Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1949, pp. 123–126.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Letter of transmittal, dated July 30, Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. iii, xvi.↩
- Member of Democratic League.↩
- Not printed.↩