893.00B/9–1549: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 16—1:08 p. m.]
Cantel 1112. Embassy has following comments on Nanking telegram 1994 to Department, repeated Shanghai 1083, September 3. In view of long record of Nationalists’ failures against Communists, the premises and conclusions as to US action strike a most responsive chord.
Yet despite our pessimism over chances for Nationalist political and economic survival on continent in next year or two, the Communists have not so far won complete victory and still have considerable task ahead of them to do so. It is thus not quite time to concede them the entire field.
A strong acceptable anti-Communist leader is not in sight and circumstances do not favor appearance of a great new name. On other hand we need to think in terms not only of “revolution” and “counterattack” against Communists but also negatively of merely stopping [Page 527] their advance, in order to preserve part of China. While it appears now improbable that this limited objective can be achieved, sight should not be lost of its value. Communists have many problems and limitations placed upon them which are perhaps even more important than capabilities or incapabilities of the Nationalists.
Nanking is surrounded by signs of Communists’ strength and unity while we daily see Nationalists’ weakness and diversion. We are not visionary, nor are we even hopeful. Yet fighting is still going on and the field is narrowing down, the footing under the aggressors is not so firm as earlier and victories will be harder to earn. It is not in our tradition to concede that all is lost before defeat is complete. However divided, the Nationalists have not quit yet either.
Various Nationalist commanders have in past for various reasons proved broken reeds, such as Wang Yao-wu, Fu Tso-yi and Ma Pu-fang. In fact the more attention the US paid to them and the more they were built up in the public mind, the sooner and harder they seemed to fall. From precedent it might be predicted that Pai Chung-hsi will go the way of his predecessors in fame. Time will tell, but time is not working entirely in favor of the Communists.
Foregoing should not be regarded as plea for aid to Nationalists now or at any time that it demonstrably would be wasted. It merely proposed that instead of focussing solely on problem of dealing with Communists we should occasionally cast an eye on the Nationalists to see how they are doing and whether we can effectively help ourselves by helping them. We should not install inflexible policy of “wait and see” and “let the Communists learn” but be prepared to back any combination able to stop the Communists. We are skeptical that such a combination will appear. Nevertheless, the stakes are so large that we should not entirely remove ourselves from the scene.
Sent Department Cantel 1112, Nanking 678, Shanghai 539.