893.00/1–449: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 5—4:28 a. m.]
25. On afternoon of January 3 Kan Chieh-hou21 called on me on behalf of Vice President and made following report. I am convinced its factual authenticity in spite of his request that it be treated as absolutely confidential.
On New Year’s Day, Generalissimo told Li Tsung-jen that he really intended to retire and would announce this very soon. He would expect Li to act for him while he was in prolonged retirement. He would stay first in Fenghua22 and if military situation made it necessary he would withdraw to Taiwan. He would locate Navy and Air Force there and remove Government’s movable assets there. If CP proves intractable he would return and carry on struggle. Generalissimo called on Li yesterday and repeated this. He also asked Li to persuade Pai Chung-hsi23 to be more patient in regard to his own resignation since Li would soon be in control. Generalissimo thus showed his fear of Kwangsi clique.
Meanwhile, Pai sent his emissary to urge Li to join him in Hankow and from there to disavow Government policy and inaugurate move for peace. It should be noted that Pai did not know of Soviet issues described below.
In considering his course in advocating peace Li felt it necessary to know more of Soviet and CCP attitudes and mutual relations. Therefore he delegated Kan to learn what he could. Lin Chung-yung, Chairman Sino-Soviet Cultural Society, gave New Year’s lunch which was attended by Miss Chiang, Secretary of Society, Chu Wu, Moscow-educated former Mayor to [of] Tihwa, son-in-law of Yu Yu-jen,24 Wang Kun-lun, member Legislative Yuan and former Chairman of Society, and Kan, who had been trying to ingratiate himself with this group. Kan has also called on Roschin.25 Incidents recorded below are composite of information obtained from Roschin and Chu.
Roschin told Kan that in January 1945, Generalissimo sent special representatives to Moscow to see Stalin26 who told him “lots of things” but that after the man’s return to China nothing had been heard from Generalissimo. Chu went into further detail. Delegate was [Page 9] Chiang Ching-kuo,27 to whom Stalin stated China’s foreign policy would be independent and not under dictation of US, also Russia did not desire China to be on her side in next war but merely be neutral; USSR would approve of coalition including all “democratic” elements. Stalin is further alleged to have said that if above China policy could be assured he would tell CCP to come to an understanding with Generalissimo and would support Kmt Government. Such coalition government would safeguard Russian interest with respect to Chinese foreign policy. Chiang Ching-kuo thought he could get his father’s approval for all this but there was no reply.
Roschin added that in May 1946 Generalissimo sent a man to call on him28 proposing that he, Generalissimo, make trip to Moscow, to which Roschin agreed and an airplane was accordingly put at his disposal. But again nothing happened. Roschin said that after these experiences Russia was unwilling to take any further part in Chinese affairs. Chu version is that in December 1945, Chiang Ching-kuo called on Roschin and said that his father was now ready to consider the points made to Stalin and would be willing visit Moscow if it were not too late. Roschin promised to wire for instructions and hoped he would get reply in 4 days. When reply came in 3 days, Generalissimo’s son said when notified of its favorable contents that situation had changed and Generalissimo would not make trip. Stalin then gave orders to USSR Embassy and Consulates not to meddle again in affairs of Chiang Government which he would like to see overthrown. Russia was afraid of China being an ally of US in next war and has hoped to exact promise of China’s neutrality from Generalissimo, but having failed desired no further dealings with him.
At present—according to Chu—two schools of thought are held in Soviet Union and in CCP.
- (1)
- If the progressive elements in Kmt are sincerely ready to cooperate with CCP and Soviet Union, they should be negotiating with them for peace, while testing Kmt by (a) evidence that they are not merely tools of US, (b) their willingness to come not as a devisive unit but into fusion of whole. This would give protection against US domination over Kmt without irritating US. (2) Neither USSR nor CCP, according to Chu, feel Kmt peace movement is sincere but has been instigated by US which, realizing that military situation is hopeless, is playing for time. CCP must, therefore, eradicate all such opposition by force, as only after this has been achieved can real coalition be effected. Even though US is offended, CCP must work for this objective by force before US has time to train and arm new Kmt troops. CCP must fight on until it can have sufficient guarantee. According to Chu, the second school of thought, namely that Kmt peace movement is insincere and instigated by US, is thought to be stronger in both Russia and among CCP.
Li feels himself to be in quandary. If in next few days Generalissimo leaves Nanking and Li takes over, should he remain here as Acting President with prestige this gives him but with no final authority? Or should he act on Pai’s advice and remove to Hankow where he will have no official position but can act independently? If he stays in Nanking and CCP armies come to Yangtze, ignoring his peace proposal, what should he then do? He would greatly appreciate American advice on his dilemma, I asked Kan to assure Li of my deep personal sympathy in these perplexities, but to express my fear that it would be difficult to obtain any explicit advice from Washington.
Chu stressed concern of Soviets that China be neutral in event of third World War. He intends to sound out Roschin as to validity of documents signed by Li, pledging China’s neutrality, and thus strengthening guarantee already implicit in formation of coalition.
- Personal adviser to Vice President Li Tsung-jen.↩
- His native place in Chekiang.↩
- Military and Political Affairs Director for Central China.↩
- President of the Chinese Control Yuan.↩
- Maj. Gen. N. V. Roschin, Soviet Ambassador in China.↩
- Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.↩
- Son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.↩
- General Roschin then was Soviet Military Attaché in China.↩