893.00/7–649: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 6—6:34 a. m.]
1443. We owe to Mao Tse-tung vote of thanks for his article “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship” as an unprecedentedly clear exposition of just where top leadership of CCP stands. Here, etched in clean sharp lines, is plan of how “science of Marxism-Leninism” is to be applied to Chinese society. Here also is expert presentation from [Page 406] Marxian point view of Chinese history last 28 years. In light of recent development in China, we see no reason to try to read between lines or to attribute to Mao any different standards and goals than he has himself set. It seems to us, rather, that Mao is merely dotting i’s and crossing t’s of his previous writings, of political theory formulated in his “new democracy” and solidarity with USSR expressed in many important CCP pronouncements since release last November of Liu Shao-chi’s article “On Nationalism and Internationalism”. Threat and rationalization of police power is only theme not previously covered in CCP writings.
Article is replete with faith in righteousness of CCP crusade. Its principal tones are of unswerving allegiance to doctrine of world revolution by violence, of devotion to USSR as center of revolutionary power, of destructive hatred of all opposing forces, of absolutism and irreconcilability Communist creed with any other political or social theory. What are to us horrors of bloody struggle are to Mao and his associates only necessary, desirable surgery on body politic of China.
In references to use of police power and other organs of state compulsion, article shows how strong is influence of Stalinism on political theory that guides CCP. It is excellent rationalization for existence of police state. Mao shares with Stalin conviction that “all mankind has to travel along road of eliminating classes, state authority and party” at some time in distant future, as well as conviction that at present time “task is to strengthen people’s state apparatus, which refers mainly to people’s army, people’s police and people’s courts”. In name of “people” it intends to base its authority on same totalitarian techniques developed in Russia. Even labor camps are foreshadowed by threat that if members of reactionary classes “are unwilling to work, people’s state police compel them to work”.
Short of unconditional promise to side with USSR in any war (which CCP pronouncements have so far avoided), article could not have aligned CCP closer to USSR. Contrarywise, it could hardly have demonstrated greater hostility toward western democracies. Solidity of alignment is shown by Mao’s claim that although China’s economic problems are so great that she has so far taken “simply first step in 10,000-mile long march”, nonetheless, it is “childish” to think of receiving genuine British or American aid, because “internationally CCP belongs to anti-imperialistic front headed by USSR and can only look for genuine friendly aid from that front”.
Manner in which Mao emphasizes to Chinese both within and outside party his conviction that no compromise is possible with west shows realization that there are great numbers of people in China, particularly among educated classes, who are not convinced Communism is only road, who aspire to make China bridge between US and USSR, [Page 407] who are unwilling to make sacrifices necessary to industrialize China in face of hostile west. Much of speech is devoted to refuting such views dear to heart of western-oriented Chinese liberal as importance of western-styled democracy, ties with US and Britain, independence from USSR, etc.; there is more than hint that people who expound such views will be considered “lackeys of foreign imperialists” and will be suitably punished.
Certain other aspects of article are also of interest. Style shows interesting similarities to that of Stalin, in use of question and answers, in way paragraphs overlap for easy readability, in simplicity of presentation, in its tailoring for unlearned, untrained audience. Admission that “young comrades who have just joined party and have not read Marxism-Leninism may not understand truth” regarding goal of classless society implies that CCP membership is far from well-indoctrinated unified organization it claims to be. That socialization or collectivization of agriculture with all its attendant disruptions and sacrifices is coming to China is indicated by assertion that “without socialization of agriculture, there will be no complete and consolidated socialism”; Mao’s plans for countryside obviously go far beyond simple agrarian reform. As respects domestic economy, Mao states that “our present policy is to restrict capitalism and not eliminate it”, thus implying policy will change as soon as conditions permit. Only passing reference to importance of foreign trade to China as opposed to emphasis devoted to necessity for China’s industrialization and autarchic independence from western world once more demonstrates extent to which Communist leadership is guided by political rather than economic considerations. This leadership shows little fear of American economic warfare seriously retarding its progress. There could be no better evidence to correctness of conclusions of our Embassy Moscow in its telegram 1620, June 27 to Department, that long view is only view US Government and its friends in west can take on China and “that Mao is not for sale now”.
Sent Dept 1443, repeated Shanghai 803, OffEmb Canton 611, Moscow 47.