893.00 Manchuria/6–449: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

1194. Embassy thinking on Manchuria as follows:

Among potential sore spots between CCP85 and USSR, far the tenderest is Manchuria. Soviet Union has now probably gained its minimal necessary strategic objectives that area, having presumably denied any enemy its use. That Soviet influence in area is strong is commonly accepted fact. That USSR has aleady established effective control over the area and is undertaking industrialization Manchuria, presumably with Chinese Communists’ assent, becoming increasingly evident. This attested by indirect evidence such as CCP statement that Manchurian progress toward socialization will be much faster than that of rest of China.

From CCP viewpoint Manchuria is China’s only developed industrial complex, only indigenous source of machines without which even minimum nation-wide industrial development impossible. But if Manchuria being developed and exploited, Russia’s Far East too has desperate needs. Opposition might be expected to arise here, thus far they have not, presumably because CCP accepts USSR role of pre-eminence in industrialization of NE. Certainly USSR would not permit vast, heavy industrial area so near her borders without strong Russian control, which undoubtedly already contributing cause in treatment our Consuls [at] Mukden and Dairen.86 When this control will become irksome, whether CCP will enventually resist further Soviet encroachment or resent that already accomplished (thus establishing conditions prerequisite Titoism), whether already too late extricate Manchuria from Soviet domination, are moot points. In light USSR past performance and CCP record subservience, prospects solutions favorable China and West are slight. Problem remains, however.

Sent Department, passed Peiping 194.

  1. Chinese Communist Party.
  2. For documentation, see pp. 933 ff. and pp. 860 ff., respectively.