893.00B/5–3149: Telegram
The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 1—4:24 a. m.]
1917. I trust that I shall not be considered impertinent if I point out there seems to be strong tendency for us to swing from one extreme to other in our thinking re Chinese Communist orientation. When I [Page 356] arrived here I was seriously disturbed by a general tendency particularly among those with great experience in China but not in Communist countries to discount possibility that Chinese Communist could ever be truly Communist. Faithful adherence to Kremlin propaganda line suggested to me that close working links existed between Chinese and Soviet Communist parties.
Now that Communists have taken over several big cities there seems to be strong swing in other direction—a belief that all Communist activities in China are Soviet Punch and Judy show. Much is made of their toughness, their illiberalism, their virulent anti-American propaganda, their deviousness, suspicion and secrecy.
That Chinese Communists are guided by Communist ideology is axiomatic. Significant items to watch are not similarities and parroted propaganda but deviations and non-Marxist deeds. They have been tough but not half as tough as Soviet might have been. Any liberal who has been duped by Communist propaganda naturally swings to violent disillusionment when he finds out the truth (see Tientsin’s to Department 356, May 2652); surprising thing is Chinese Communists have not been more narrow and tyrannical. Virulent anti-American propaganda is natural in view of our aid to Nationals. Re vociferous Chinese Communist adherence to Soviet Russia this only to be expected in view widespread speculation re possible Titoism.
Interesting points to my mind are indications that Chinese Communists are not 100% subservient to Kremlin, that their party is not monolithic in basic thinking on such vital points as relations with west and that Soviets themselves are not too pleased with Chinese Communist successes.
To discuss last point only note:
- 1.
- Sino-Soviet treaty 194553 was implied sellout of Chinese Communists.
- 2.
- Soviet Embassy was only one to go to Canton.
- 3.
- Vyshinsky got out of sick bed to see Ambassador Foo on departure to assume Foreign Ministry.
- 4.
- Sinkiang negotiations have been with collapsing National regime.
- 5.
- Relative failure of Soviets to help Chinese Communists as compared with Greek Communists.
- 6.
- Anna Louise Strong54 deportation.
- 7.
- Reported absence of any glorification of Chinese Communist heroes in recent May 1 parade Moscow.
- 8.
- Closing of Soviet Consulate Peiping, Shanghai.
Evidence regarding other points too extensive, varied and controversial to discuss in one telegram; it ranges from such major points [Page 357] as Chinese Communist insistence on protection foreign property to such trifling straws in wind as relative absence of pictures of Stalin.
Although far from conclusive above points give some plausibility to French ConGen’s view that Soviets do not want strong united China because they know they cannot control such a China; that their whole game has been to weaken and divide China (note possible analogy to Soviet opposition to south Slav federation).
To my mind it is as yet far too early to say whether Chinese Communists are in fact subservient to Soviets or not. Deviations may be significant or may merely represent a temporary yielding to expediency. Test will probably come when Communists control entire country and have had some time to reveal policies.
Viewing situation in historical perspective it seems to me inherently improbable that Soviets can indefinitely exert control over China through Chinese Communists who have risen to power largely through own efforts and can scarcely be brought to heel by force. Vital question is whether break will come in 2 years or 200. Our own policies may profoundly influence this. I must reiterate that this telegram should not be taken as predicting an early break. I merely want to indicate it is still much too early to form a considered final judgment.
Sent Department, repeated Nanking 1048, Canton 590.