Office of the Historian

893.00/1–1249: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 12, 1949—6 p. m.
[Received January 12—2:49 p. m.]

86. Embassy does not expect Soviet Union react favorably Chinese mediation approach (Nanking 61, January 8). Action of CCP in naming Chiang and other Kmt leaders as war criminals, Tass denial press reports regarding possible Soviet mediation (Embtel 3, January 268) and attacks on “peace feelers” by Communist press outside Russia (Paris 85, January 7, to Department68) would seem accurately forecast Soviet attitude toward proposition now made by China.

Considerations motivating Soviet and CCP positions (which at least on this point Embassy assumes to be synonymous) undoubtedly include following:

(1)
While coalition government remains for CCP as for other Communist parties classic objective, in present case CCP and Soviets probably see neither necessity nor desirability try achieve such objective through negotiations with present Kmt Government. On contrary, kind of coalition desired by CCP easily obtainable if present Kmt leadership—now branded war criminals—completely replaced. [Page 39] After all, Mao’s stated objective is overthrow Kmt Government. (Nanking 85, November 21.69)
(2)
Soviets, believing time on their side, may see no advantage intervening now at Chiang Government request when it may expect CCP later establish government on own independent terms. Meanwhile CCP may more profitably concentrate consolidating territory now under control.
(3)
Rejection negotiate present Kmt Government leaves Soviets and CCP completely free proceed deliberately to establishing own type “coalition” regime including such elements Li Chi-shen, other Kmt dissidents and representatives fellow-traveling parties.
(4)
Both Soviets and CCP confident present Chinese Government possesses seeds own rapid decay and collapse. If such coalition, as suggested 3 above established, it would provide powerful attraction to any lingering or successor Kmt regime. Furthermore, Soviets and CCP undoubtedly confident that Western Powers can and will do nothing prevent such eventualities.

With regard question identity Stalin’s70 and Mao’s policies, and plans for China, Embassy finds no evidence of divergence. As frequently reported by Nanking, CCP policy seems support Kremlin more openly than ever. Interestingly, Jap CP organ Akahata editorialized December 11 “Victory People’s Liberation Army Is Victory CCP, Victory Marxism–Leninism”.

However, foregoing by no means rules our [out] possibility Stalin may have misgivings about future docility headstrong Chinese offspring flushed with victory and sense own importance. Present silence Soviet press on China may indicate satisfactory agreement not yet worked out on nature and policies new Communist government for China. Unquestionably Soviets feel keenly overriding necessity prevent Tito-like defection China and therefore proceeding cautiously. Meanwhile, parties outside Soviet Union, without responsibility for future guidance China, exploit CCP victories to maximum, thus enhancing own prestige and the world Communist movement.

With regard to US reply to Chinese note, Embassy ventures only to comment that mediation by four powers offers little hope, that prospect of coalition government, regardless of Soviet attitude, is uninviting, and that best advice for China may be rally forces to maintain National Government within reduced territory on firmly established base so China, with broadened and reformed government including non-Kmt parties but no Communists.

Sent Department 86, repeated Nanking 6, Tokyo 4, London as 12, Paris as 17.

Kohler
  1. Not printed.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Telegram No. 2273 to the Department; Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vii, p. 593.↩
  4. Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, Soviet Prime Minister and President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.↩