893.00/1–1149
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Mr. Bevin’s62 Views on the Chinese Approach for Intervention
These are my preliminary reactions. It is obvious that we cannot delay our reply to the Chinese Government too long, if only because it is going to be difficult to continue to deny that any approach by them has been received.
On the whole I am inclined to think that intervention would be a mistake. First because it is unlikely that such intervention would materially alter the course of events and secondly because the failure of the Western Powers to intervene successfully can only be expected to react unfavourably upon their future relations with China. I share the view of Sir R. Stevenson that apart from the desire to gain time the Chinese Government’s approach is designed to put the blame upon others for the situation which is likely to be created. If we are correct in assuming that mediation is unlikely to change the course of events then the blame is likely to be placed on us for abandoning China to the Communists. Equally we should be held responsible for bringing a regime into existence in China which Sooner or later will be communist dominated.
My preliminary inclination would therefore be politely to decline the Chinese request. In so doing we might point to the fact that our policy towards China is governed by the Moscow Declaration of 27th December 1945,63 in which we stated that we were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government for broader participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government and for a cessation of civil strife. We also reaffirmed our adherence to the policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of China. We might go on to say that we are reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of China since the future of that country can after all only ultimately be determined by the Chinese people themselves but we might express the hope for an early termination of hostilities in order to relieve the suffering of the people,
If we should decide to reply to the Chinese on the lines of the foregoing paragraph we still have to consider what the Soviet Union will be likely to do. They might equally well abstain from intervention [Page 36] since events are on the whole moving in their favour. If on the other hand they alone should decide to intervene then it is doubtful whether such intervention would in fact produce any different result. Too active an intervention by the Soviet Union might on the contrary tend eventually to antagonise the Chinese people. The Soviet Union will no doubt be waiting for us to put a foot wrong and on our present estimates we are more likely to do that if we intervene than if we do not.
When we and the Americans and the French have made up our minds I do not think we can escape the necessity for consultation with the Soviet Union and if we wait too long to do this we shall be open to the suspicion of having framed our attitude. To this extent therefore there is also some need for urgency.
I should be grateful to learn the views of the United States Government.
- Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- For the communiqué on the Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers, December 27, 1945, see telegram 4284, December 27, 1945, 3 a. m., from Moscow, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 815; or Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1027.↩