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Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations 29
I lunched alone with Dr. Wellington Koo30 and talked with him confidentially and very informally about the general world situation. We both agreed that as a result of the Atlantic Pact the chances are strong that the Soviet Government will not make an armed attack or seek to advance through Western Europe. Doubtless the result of the Atlantic Pact will be to intensify the Soviet efforts in the Far East.
Dr. Wellington Koo stressed what has often been said before—that from the world point of view it is just as necessary, if not more so, to block further Soviet advance in the Far East as in the West. He said that in his opinion until the Soviet Government had succeeded in effectively closing the frontier in China to prevent American troops from entering the Soviet back door through China, the Soviet Government could not undertake a strong advance through the West. In his opinion, therefore, the Soviet Government is even more vitally concerned at the present, as one of the preliminary steps in seeking world domination, in effectively sewing up the position in the Far East and thus preventing a backdoor attack than in temporary victories in the West.
Dr. Wellington Koo went on to say that the Chinese people for many years had felt the friendship of America and believed in the friendly concern of the people of America for the people of China. He said that it was a matter of keen regret to him that due to recent events the Chinese people were now beginning to feel that America’s friendship for them was only superficial and they were coming to believe that the present American attitude is to leave the Chinese people to their own fate.
I asked Dr. Wellington Koo what was in his mind as to the most constructive program which the United States might follow in the face of the present exceedingly difficult conditions. He replied that in his opinion the first constructive step which the United States should take would be the issue of a statement by the President or the Secretary of State making clear that the American people still feel a [Page 262] vital friendship for the Chinese people and view with deep concern their present plight. He said that this would put new heart into the Chinese people who are at present discouraged and disheartened. He said that the effect of this would of course last only a few months and he hoped that the second step would be the sending by the United States of a mission to China to explore possible avenues and methods of getting technical help to China to buttress her defenses against increasing Soviet infiltration and advance. He said that the conditions in China, and in the world had so vitally changed since the visit of the Marshall Mission31 that the time called for a new appraisal of the situation and a new exploration of constructive means by which the American people could give assistance to the Chinese.
He went on to describe methods of Soviet infiltration. He said that so-called “people’s courts” would be set up by the Soviets to arrest and try landlords of a district. In these “people’s courts” accusation by the peasants against landholders would be heard and the landholders systematically liquidated either by shooting or deportation. The peasants would then be told that the land was now theirs under the progressive and friendly Communist rule. The peasants would also be informed that in place of the 50% of the produce of the land which was formerly taken by the Chinese Government for taxes, the new landholders would be asked to contribute only 30%. Several months of this “honeymoon” would continue. After the expiration of several months, the new landholders would be told that increased funds were necessary to finance and support the Communist soldiers who were fighting to protect them from the return of the former landlords. An additional 10% of the produce from the land would therefore be added to the fixed 30%. In another month or two, a fresh requisition of an additional 10% would be asked, perhaps for the building of hospitals for the soldiers; and so it would go on with increases of 10% until some 70% of the produce of the land would be required to be paid by the new landholders to the Communist Government. By then, the Chinese peasants would be in the tight grip of Communist rule with all hope gone of overthrowing their new rulers.
Dr. Wellington Koo said that this infiltration and penetration of Soviet rule had by this time engulfed Inner Mongolia and was proceeding fast in Manchuria and in other parts of northern China.
He concluded by again telling of the present disheartened feelings of the Chinese people and expressing the strong hope that the United States Government would put new heart into them by a public statement, [Page 263] followed in a few months by the sending of a new United States mission to China to explore possible avenues of help and assistance.
- Submitted to the Secretary of State on May 10 by Mr. Butterworth.↩
- Chinese Ambassador in the United States.↩
- For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 745 ff, and ibid., 1946, volumes ix and x .↩