893.00/4–1949: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 19—3:14 p. m.]
971. Not only content, but space accorded it by Pravda suggest significance statement by Jen Pi-shih at CCP Youth Congress [Page 250] (Embtel 949, April 1820). This seems to Embassy on basis information reaching us to be most important CCP policy statement to be issued in many months. Embassy will not undertake analysis which Nanking much more capable doing. We only desire point out that statement seems to us be clear effort publicly serve notice that CCP on straight narrow orthodox Moscow path and quash rumors possibility Titoist21 deviations. Emphasis on industrialization and statement center of gravity moved from countryside to city has ring of pledge of faith to Cominform and final determination and proclamation of line already hinted (Embtel 259, February 220).
Embassy believes China problem at top Politburo agenda; in fact reliable source reports Molotov22 now primarily concerned China (A–390, April 1820). Lack editorial comment on Chinese problem probably due its restriction as subject too hot for any but highest level to handle. Kremlin obviously cannot risk loss of fruits greatest victory since Russian revolution and therefore we can be sure best talent [and] maximum energy being concentrated to steer Chinese developments in way Moscow desires and to guarantee no deviation or heresy will occur.
Permanent identity Mao’s and Kremlin’s policies is of course great question. Mao enjoys personal prestige and adulation not permitted leaders most other parties.
Embassy notes that CCP has not yet descended to degree of abject Stalin-worship followed most other Communist regimes; seems interesting that Jen Pi-shih cites Mao’s leadership as one reason Chinese economy will be built more quickly than Soviet economy after October revolution, and neglects mention Stalin or Lenin. However, all indications point to present Stalin-Mao solidarity and uncertainties of CCP–USSR relations are uncertainties of future and not of present.
We believe that meanwhile Soviets encourage propaganda that Chinese cannot be easily absorbed (Cantel 181, April 1 to Department) and are even pleased at dissemination in West of idea Mao will turn Tito. If Western vigilance can thus be weakened, Moscow benefits. For this reason, we think unfortunate that US public opinion should be led to accept comfortable feeling Mao rebel at heart. Healthier attitude would be public assumption no rift is possible.
Facing discouraging Chinese situation, seems to us we must work as hard to develop Soviet–CCP rift as Molotov must be working to [Page 251] prevent it. With full realization optimism not justified, we must explore every way and means to break the Moscow hold on China.
Sent Department 971, repeated Nanking 43, Canton 11.