893.00/4–1649: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 16—3:16 a. m.]
771. Before expiration of Communist “ultimatum” (see my 716 to Department April 6, repeated Canton 228, Shanghai 342) on April 12, two things happened which influenced their subsequent action:
(1) Li Tsung-jen sent humble, politically astute message to Mao Tse-tung; (2) local press published story of ultimatum with fair degree accuracy. These developments, according to Li’s advisor Kan, gave Communists cause [pause] and nothing more has been heard about ultimatum or deadline in those precise terms. In fact during this period Mao dispatched his polite, conciliatory message (see my 743 to Department April 11, repeated Canton 239, Shanghai 356) and in discussions in Peiping is reported to have replied to Nationalist delegates’ remonstrances that crossing of Yangtze by Communist troops would be natural consequence of coalition government at which time Communist troops should be able to come south and Nationalist troops move north.
April 14, however, Communists reverted to sterner position with demand made through Nationalist delegation Peiping that as token Nationalist Government good faith Communist military force be allowed now to establish bridgeheads on south bank Yangtze at two points: (1) Kiangyin (first fortified point on Yangtze upstream from Moluh); (2) nine districts (hsien) opposite Anking. Government instructed its delegate Peiping to reply this demand not acceptable.
Communists have repeated on several occasions and constantly revert to proposal for peaceful crossing of Yangtze. It would seem to indicate no great confidence in their own ability to force crossing. While there is no time limit on this most recent demand, Nationalist Government continues to be apprehensive of resumption military offensive from day-to-day. Government feels Communists have not settled down serious discussion eight points pending efforts induce Government permit peaceful crossing of river.
There have been, however, some discussions between Nationalist and Communist delegates on first of Mao’s eight points, that is, war [Page 243] criminals. Position Nationalist delegates took was that it was unfortunate to insist on designation of various Chinese leaders as war criminals in civil struggle. Mao Tse-tung is reported to have replied that names could be eliminated from agreement with clause merely stating that those guilty of war crimes would be punished. This was received in local government circles as important conclusion on part of Communists and possible useful formula for point one.
Sent Department 771; repeated Embassy Canton 255, Shanghai 379, Peiping 126.