893.00B/4–649: Airgram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)
A–33. Urdesp 62, March 10. Department has given careful consideration to proposal set forth in urdesp 62 and particularly to nature of approach you would expect to make to Communist leaders as described on page 2 of this despatch. You are hereby authorized to discuss with the top Chinese Communist leaders the points described in urdesp except as set forth hereunder.
Department notes your statement: “My Government might therefore feel called upon to assist any nucleus of organized opposition first in arousing the Chinese people to the danger of their national sovereignty and personal liberties and then in using all possible means for their self-protection. If this were undertaken at all I had reason to believe that we would use every available resource we possessed to restore real liberation to the Chinese people.” While you state that your approach would not in any sense represent an ultimatum [Page 231] or threat, it would be difficult to avoid an interpretation of the two above-quoted sentences as a threat of possible U.S. action under certain circumstances. Even more pertinent in this connection is the strong unlikelihood that the U.S. could or would “use every available resource we possessed to restore real liberation to the Chinese people”. Should there be continuing resistance and resultant disorder following a breakdown of peace negotiations, the U.S. would, of course, have to examine the situation with a view to deciding what course it might adopt. However, given the current situation and the estimates of the relative military capabilities of the National Government and the Chinese Communists, there is little ground for assuming that the U.S. Government would at this juncture embark upon a program of all-out military and economic aid for China.
In the light of the foregoing, it is desired that this portion of your proposed manner of approach be changed to read along the following lines: “Should this situation appear to constitute a threat to the national security and interests of the United States, the U.S. Government would have to re-examine the situation in China with a view to adopting a course of action calculated best to serve the interests of the American people and world peace.”
While the Department agrees with your view that it may be visionary to imagine that the Chinese Communists can be influenced toward a more broadly tolerant policy, it also agrees with your statement that because of the important issues at stake such an approach is worth the effort. In the event that your approach achieves no results, it might be desirable to give full publicity to the nature of the discussion with the Chinese Communists and the Communist rejection of the overtures. However, every care should be taken to avoid any publicity regarding your approach to the Chinese Communist leaders and the nature of such an approach. The question of giving publicity to the proposed discussions should be referred with your recommendations to the Department for decision. In any telegraphic reports you may submit in regard to this matter, you should classify them as eyes only for the Secretary.