893.00/4–149: Telegram
The Consul General at Canton (Ludden) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2—2:06 a. m.]
75. Reference Embcirtel March 24, received March 30.72 Canton pacification headquarters estimates approximately 37,000 Communist guerrillas Kwangtung. AMA73 and I consider this figure small; total probably in neighborhood 55,000. In assessing so-called Communist strength South China consideration must be given long history banditry, piracy, main trade routes southeast Kwangtung, major food deficit area China, thus banditry for economic reasons common phenomenon probably accounting for major portion above estimate. In recent times organized lawlessness for profit, particularly along smuggling routes in delta, along East River and Bias Bay area, accounts for additional sizeable group. Third grouping developed since V–J Day and steadily increasing in direct ratio loss prestige National Government is composed individuals in opposition policies Government and, though believed numerically inferior compared first two groups, it is composed more intelligent, literate elements and is very probable main target Communist blandishments.
No question but that Communists endeavoring infiltrate bandit and dissident groups using Hong Kong as financial and propaganda base. Communist organization rural areas not thus far evident and not important with exception Hainan Island where regular Communist organizations similar former North China border region governments, function and control 80% of island by day and 100% of island by [Page 220] night (see Canton voluntary report 1, January 11, 1949,74 political conditions Hainan Island).
In considering total strength figure mentioned above, following points are important: (1) Ratio of men to serviceable weapons approximately 2 to 1; (2) training standards low to nonexistent; (3) discipline is by consent; (4) ability to stand determined assault poor. In summary, bandits, dissidence and/or Communists Kwangtung, except Hainan, composed heterogeneous small groups without cohesion. Many, possibly the majority, of these groups have of late assumed titles such as “People’s Liberation Army”, “People’s Self Defence Unit”, “People’s anti-Collection Column”, “Democratic Joint Army”, but in the main their methods and operations continue as in the past to be those of gangsters, as little tinged by any political ideology as the operations of gangsters anywhere.
At present time there is no reason to doubt capability available national and provincial forces continue maintain reasonable level public security this area provided there is no major incursion southeast China regular Communist forces. Of late there has been a rash of highly irresponsible news reporting of increased “Communist” military strength this region. Of this we see no real evidence but insofar as economic conditions continue deteriorate unrest throughout southeast generally may be anticipated, with consequent increase Communist efforts take advantage thereof.
With regard Kwangsi, reliable information is to effect far better conditions stability [prevail than?] in Kwangtung. There is little if any banditry of [or?] dissidence; a generally healthy political situation prevails and the popular provincial administration is well in control of situation. Possible exception to foregoing is in Shih Wan Ta Shan region (22 north 108 east), notorious bandit stronghold from whence, according French reports of doubtful reliability, Chinese Communists are aiding Vietnam rebels.
AMA currently preparing detailed study Communist strength southeast.
Sent Nanking 46, repeated Department.
- Not found in Department of State files: it probably was an Embassy instruction pursuant to telegram No. 356, March 17 (not printed), asking for report to the Department of extent of Communist infiltration in South and Southwest China through bandit activities or otherwise.↩
- Assistant Military Attaché.↩
- Not printed.↩