893.00/3–3049: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:47 p. m.]
Cantel 179. While agreeing on increased stature Li Tsung-jen, am inclined disagree final sentence Nanking’s 663, March 28, repeated Canton 198, Shanghai 304.
Li’s weakness vis-á-vis terms in forthcoming peace negotiations, it seems to me, lies less in economic field than in political. As Sun Fo suggested (Cantel 173, March 26, repeated Nanking 157, Shanghai. 117), Communists are likely demand acceptable evidence Li has authority to commit non-Communist China. Communists must know of Generalissimo’s machinations. They must realize that peace with Li does not end all resistance to their expansion in China. He cannot commit in advance or control the five Ma’s66 in the northwest or the feudalistic overlords in the southwest any more than he can the Generalissimo. Why then offer him other than his choice of “Peiping” or “Tientsin” peace? Their broadcasts seem to indicate that to be their intention.
I agree that continued economic aid is desirable, but would justify its continuance on need to maintain order behind Government lines rather than on strengthening Li’s hands in his negotiations which, I am convinced, are doomed in advance to failure unless he accepts “reasonable surrender”.
Sent Department Cantel 179; repeated Nanking 162, Shanghai 120.
- Mohammedan leaders in the northwestern provinces of Ningsia, Tsinghai, and Sinkiang.↩