Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/1–1049

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] January 10, 1949.

Subject: Chinese Government Proposal That the U.S. Government Act as an Intermediary in Initiating Negotiations With the Chinese Communist Party

Discussion:

Ambassador Stuart, in his telegram No. 61 of January 8, quotes an aide-mémoire from the Chinese Government proposing that the U.S. Government act as an intermediary in initiating negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party for the purpose of restoring peace in China. The aide-mémoire states that similar notes have been sent to the British, French and Soviet Ambassadors at Nanking. In his telegram No. 62 of January 9 the Ambassador reports his discussion of the matter with his British and French colleagues and their agreement on the following points:

1. The proposal represents a Chinese Government effort to play for time at this critical period.

2. It is an effort to avoid loss of face by requesting foreign powers to approach the Communists, an approach the Chinese Government could make if it so desired.

3. Mediation could not possibly succeed unless all four powers were willing to act in concert and it is most unlikely that the USSR would agree to participate.

4. Even if the USSR agreed to participate, its good faith would be doubtful and it would thus be ineffective in relation to the Chinese Communist Party.

In his telegram No. 64 of January 10, the Ambassador questions point 3 above and indicates the possibility that there may have been prior understanding between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Embassy for the proposal, the wording making it possible for the USSR to act as an intermediary on a unilateral basis. The Ambassador suggests that we might approach the USSR regarding the feasibility of a joint approach in an attempt to forestall possible unilateral action by the USSR with the accompanying prestige attaching to a successful move to end hostilities.

Various factors should be considered in connection with possible U.S. participation in an intermediary role:

1. The U.S. would be placed in the position of responsibility for seeking to form a coalition government with Chinese Communist participation, which would inevitably mean Communist domination. This would have extremely undesirable repercussions, particularly in France and Italy, as well as Japan and other areas of the Far East, and would affect the European Recovery Program and Western Union. It would also have unfavorable domestic reactions.

2. U.S. participation in an intermediary role would involve U.S. responsibility for whatever resulted from its action. The previous U.S. exercise of its good offices in China has resulted in criticism by Chinese Government officials who seek to place upon the U.S. a measure of responsibility for subsequent developments allegedly arising from the Chinese Government’s negotiations with the Communists.

3. It is not certain that the USSR would refuse to act as an intermediary. If the three western powers were to refuse, the USSR might accept and utilize this action as propaganda material charging the western powers with “war mongering” and describing its action as evidence of its desire for peace. There would seem to be no possibility, however, that the three western powers could act in concert with the USSR as intermediaries. The USSR would obviously seek to obtain international sanction for Chinese Communist domination of China and, in view of the present strong military position of the Chinese Communists, would have in the background the threat of Communist military action as the decisive bargaining weapon in its hands.

4. The Chinese Government is undoubtedly playing for time and may be seeking to involve the western powers. Without Soviet participation there would be no chance of success, since the Chinese Communists in their present strong military position need not look with favor on negotiations and might even refuse to negotiate with the present Chinese Government.

The British Embassy has informed us that the matter will be taken up in the British Cabinet today and that the Foreign Office has indicated that it would like to act in general accord with the U.S. Government on the problem. The British Embassy also states that the British Government has approached the French Government in this regard.

Recommendations:

Attached is a suggested reply⁵³ to the Chinese Government’s aide-mémoire for your approval and submission to the President. This affords us an opportunity to set the record clear with respect to General Marshall’s mission to China, an approach which cannot, of course, be made by the British and French Governments. The reply reviews the history of the previous U.S. good offices effort and concludes that no good purpose would be served by the U.S. Government’s acting as an intermediary. It is suggested that the President’s approval be obtained for the rejection of the Chinese proposal and the general tone of the reply, rather than the specific wording, in order to allow for such revision as may be necessary to meet the British desires in the matter, assuming that the British Government also declines the proposal.

53. Infra.