893.00/3–2249: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 22—5:13 a. m.]
Cantel 153. Proposed response Connally’s32 request comments McCarran Bill33 Depintel March 1734 seems most appropriate. As I analyze situation at moment, we may expect Communists continue deployment troops north bank Yangtze and when they are ready attempt crossing we may anticipate announcement willingness negotiate peace on terms they will stipulate and which may be expected to be reiteration Mao Tse-tung’s eight points.35 Their announced willingness negotiate will likely be in form ultimatum threatening crossing Yangtze if terms not accepted within time limit. It is unlikely terms will be acceptable to Kmt leaders although they will appear reasonable to war-weary Chinese masses.
Even though rumors of Communist morale difficulties may have foundation, it may be anticipated Communist troops will fight. On the contrary, however, there appears little likelihood Nationalist troops can be reinspired with will to resist. Chang Chun may, as he claims, be able rally forces southwest to defend themselves, but it will unlikely be defense of character long to delay Communists once they have determined on advance. There is even some thought that with breakdown peace negotiations, process regional fragmentation will be accelerated, with each area seeking fend for itself, thus making [Page 191] more easy Communist task. Dissident Kwangtung Legislative Yuan members remaining Canton demanding “defense of constitution” are an indication this trend.
As I see it, when Communists have deployed their troops and issued their ultimatum and had it rejected, they may be expected cross Yangtze, meeting little resistance and occupying urban centers Yangtze Valley. They will then have the capability of continuing their advance in southwest or south, overcoming without too much difficulty any regional resistance they may encounter. Whether they will proceed to the task immediately or delay for months or years rests solely for their determination.
In previous telegram, Cantel 71, February 23, repeated Nanking 68, Shanghai 41, I suggested possibility Li Tsung-jen might supply effective leadership. I am now less inclined to that view. He has increased tremendously, in stature; has greatly increased his following, yet the centripetal forces in Free China remain too strong for him to overcome. The deep-seated Chinese characteristic of family solidarity is too strong and we are witnessing a frantic search by each individual leader to save himself and his family first, then maybe his province, with little if any thought to the principles involved or the nation. Also, if, as alleged, cruiser Chungking has been put out of action by CAF36 we may still see Gimo re-emerge in his Foochow–Amoy–Taiwan triangle.
I have been chided of late by many Chinese officials from the Vice Premier and Foreign Minister37 down for what they term our “wait and see” policy in respect of China. I have responded that unlike the British who are obviously seeking to follow a “neutral” policy in China, we are like the pugilist who is sparring for time and awaiting an opening for a telling blow, refraining in the meantime from wasting his strength on a haymaker. I have put forward the arguments outlined Depintel March 17 and have stressed need for Chinese demonstrate possibility effective resistance Communist expansion before expecting US make further investments National China. In each case I have been given impression of utter inability China cope unaided with situation. In other words, sole means of turning tide in China would, as Department suggests, require use of “large US forces in actual combat, contrary our traditional policy and national interests”.
Sent Department, repeated Nanking 132, Shanghai 95, pouched Chungking, Peiping, Hankow.
- Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩
- Senator Pat McCarran, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee; for documentation on his bill, see vol. ix, pp. 599 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; for the eight points, see telegram No. 41, January 14, from the Consul General at Peiping, p. 49.↩
- Chinese Air Force.↩
- Wu Te-chen, who had resigned. The new Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs had not yet left his post as Chinese Ambassador in the Soviet Union; pending the assumption of duties by Foo Ping-sheung, Vice Minister George Yeh was named Acting Minister on April 5.↩