893.00B/3–1049
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 28.]
Sir: I have the honor to request that I be authorized to discuss with top Communist leaders the points at issue between the United States of America and the Chinese Communist Party in the hope that this [Page 174] would help toward a better mutual understanding. When and how such interviews could be arranged would necessarily be left to my discretion.
The Chinese Communist Party has revealed an increasingly anti-American sentiment. As its control spreads over the more important coastal provinces and further inland this will find concrete expression in many forms more harmful to us than their incessant vituperative broadcasts. Some of their anti-imperialism phraseology may be nothing more than the Party line inspired by the Kremlin. But a factor is unquestionably our military and other assistance to the National Government. The indignation over this is heartily shared by most of the intellectuals whether or not they are in sympathy with Communism. This is partly because they have lost all respect for their Government and partly because they believe that it is our aid alone which has enabled it to carry on the detested civil war. The Chinese Communist Party’s animosity to us is greatly intensified by their suspicious attitude to all who are not of their own persuasion. It may be that there is something in Communist ideology which develops suspicion. It is also a distinctive Chinese characteristic. In any case I have never known anything else to compare with the suspicions of Chinese Communists. This colors all of their dealings with outsiders. They see the worst therefore in American behavior as this concerns China. Making full allowance for propagandist aims I am convinced that in their abuse of us there is a substantial residuum of genuine misapprehension. If this could be removed or to some extent reduced it would prepare the way for a settlement of the remaining problems. Or in a more hopeful vein, if American democratic influences could continue to pervade a communist dominated China and to modify its intolerance, the advantages for stability in Eastern Asia and elsewhere would be enormous.
I should like to approach the Chinese Communists not only as an official representative of the American Government but as one who through long residence here is known to have consistently stood for Chinese national independence and democratic progress as well as for closer American-Chinese relations primarily because of the benefits these would bring to the Chinese people. However much they might incline to discredit me as having in recent years become identified with what they denounce as bellicose American imperialism, I should expect that my previous activities and my personal acquaintance with many of them would not be entirely disregarded.
I should begin by reminding them of the long history of American good will for China as shown both by our Government and by private philanthropy or personal service, extending down to the statements [Page 175] issued by President Truman in December 194596 and 194697 and the intentions of the Marshall Mission.98 They cannot explain this away as wholly due to enlightened self-interest or to even baser motives, nor can the American nation have completely changed its character since then. What has happened, however, is an extremely disconcerting experience in our dealings with the Soviet Union and our observation of the techniques and objectives of the Communist Party in other countries. It is an ineluctable inference that these apply also to the Chinese Communist Party. If they have suspicions of us we also have our suspicions. These envisage the attempt to establish a totalitarian state in China, on the Russian model, in which all free intercourse of thought and action, of information and belief, will be banned and the usual coercive methods will be employed to enforce uniformity in harmony with communist ideology. The American Government recognizes fully the right of the Chinese people to adopt any form of government they choose but is well aware that under this system there could be no untrammeled opportunity to express their genuine opinion. So far from bringing “liberation” and “new democracy” it seems to us to be a more subtle and sinister form of despotism, the last phase of outmoded domination of the whole by a highly organized minority. If it succeeds in China this would greatly strengthen the movement toward “one world” through violent revolution as advocated by orthodox exponents of communist strategy. Or if, as is perhaps more probable, there would be continuing resistance the resultant disorders might also seem to constitute a threat to our own national security and to world peace. My Government might therefore feel called upon to assist any nucleus of organized opposition first in arousing the Chinese people to the danger of their national sovereignty and personal liberties and then in using all possible means for their self-protection. If this were undertaken at all I had reason to believe that we would use every available resource we possessed to restore real liberation to the Chinese people. But the cost in human suffering and economic destruction would be enormous, Under these circumstanes it would be immensely to the advantage of all concerned to endeavor to clear away mutual suspicions or misunderstandings and to cooperate for the common good. American public opinion would only be satisfied by convincing evidence of the basic freedoms and of a constructive, friendly foreign policy. My deep interest in the welfare of the Chinese people, more especially of the students, and my appreciation of any truly democratic [Page 176] and progressive political program inspire me to make this final effort to serve a nation I have learned to love. In doing so I am confident also that the American people as a whole desire only China’s independence, peace, economic recovery and open democracy, with no ulterior designs.
The above paragraph contains the substance of what I have in mind, but not as an official message to be delivered, still less as in any sense an ultimatum or threat. I should hope to convey these sentiments in friendly discussions. If these prove to be promising they can be implemented in some more specific form. If, on the other hand, my definite impression is unfavorable I fear that any hope of a viable solution through peaceful negotiations had better be abandoned. Careful thought could meanwhile be given to what course we should in this event adopt.
My matured opinion is that we can do most to combat Communism in China by the twin advocacy of nationalism and the basic freedoms. The former still wins the quickest response from politically conscious Chinese, including perhaps the majority of Communists, and is in any case one that the Chinese Communist Party cannot ignore in view of the prevalent fear of Russia. It is one on which our own history and our consistent China policy stand us in good stead. Among the freedoms that of publication is probably the most important. Chinese love to read and have keen intellectual curiosity. The Chinese Communist Party rely greatly on their own controlled publicity but have committed themselves to freedom of the press. Their denial of this will make them very unpopular and any attempts to disguise their control can be easily exposed. We shall be true to ourselves by emphasizing these two features and can thus accentuate the contrast with reactionary suppressive tactics. The meaning of this will not be lost in other Asiatic countries. Nor will the fact that we are not relying merely on our wealth and power. These can be reserved for later use if necessary. With free exchange of ideas and information we need have no fear of undue Russian influence in China.
Since General Marshall’s departure from China over two years ago there has been steady deterioration both in the position of the National Government and in American prestige. It has distressed me to have been able to do so little to arrest these unfortunate trends. But I should find deep satisfaction in attempting this final service to my country and to the cause of liberalism in China. It may be naively visionary to imagine that I or any one else can influence the Chinese Communist Party to a more broadly tolerant policy. But in view of the fateful issues at stake it is abundantly worth the effort [Page 177] and will at the lowest justify us the more in any sterner measures we may feel called upon to take.
In view of the possibility of an early opportunity for such a conference I should appreciate an airgram in reply as soon as convenient.
Respectfully yours,
- December 15, 1945; Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945.↩
- December 18, 1946; ibid., December 29, 1946, p. 1179.↩
- For documentation concerning the Marshall Mission, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 745 ff. and ibid., 1946, volumes ix and x .↩