893.00/3–749
The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)85
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following attempted estimate of the accomplishments of the Shanghai nonpartisan peace delegation to Peiping in the light of (1) careful scrutiny of local press news and editorial comment; (2) accounts given to officers of the Consulate General, by two persons close to Dr. W. W. Yen (his cousin, F. C. Yen, and Dr. James Pott of St. John’s University) of observations which Dr. W. W. Yen made, separately, to them following the completion of his mission; and (3) recent known developments at Shanghai.
[Here follows detailed report respecting “an overall peace settlement”, The Shanghai-Nanking area, and “restoration of communications”.]
In the light of this background and of the before-mentioned clues as to the general tenor of the Shanghai delegation’s talks with the Communists, it seems only logical to surmise that the mission’s main efforts were concerned with peace and prosperity for Shanghai. The delegates presumably pledged themselves to the task of preserving the city’s rich installations and resources against loss through removals, sabotage, plunder and resort to armed defense; and sought assurances from the Communists that, in return for such cooperation, the Communists would refrain from any precipitate forcible action against the city and would adopt tolerant policies toward private vested interests and business activities. That the delegates promises may have gone beyond those of which Li Tsung-jen is aware, and approves, and included commitments looking to cooperation with Communists’ plans for establishing their control or influence over the city even though a breakdown of Li’s peace talks should force him to revert to war and armed defense of the Yangtze line is only conjectural, but entirely possible (despite Li’s rapidly growing popularity in this area).
Whatever the delegates’ promises were, it is clear that they were sufficient to elicit the desired assurances from the Communists to a degree which the delegates found encouraging. (According to a well-placed and generally reliable Chinese source, the Communists impressed the delegates with being less anxious to expedite establishment of complete physical control of the city than they were interested in effecting an early extension of their influence to certain key administrative and economic organs.) The return of the mission to [Page 167] Shanghai has brought a marked surge of optimism throughout the city, and such optimism is obviously more a matter of eased selfish apprehensions as to the future of Shanghai than it is one of hopefulness over the prospects of the Central Government’s overall peace overtures. It is an optimism which chiefly reflects the relief of Shanghai propertied circles and their apparent confidence that the Communists (1) are in no hurry to take Shanghai; (2) will not seize it by force; and (3) will use moderation toward private property and enterprise. There are already indications that this optimism is swelling the movement back to Shanghai of wealthy Chinese who fled to Hongkong and elsewhere.
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department without covering despatch; received March 21.↩