711.93/2–2149: Telegram

The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State

Cantel 66. Chen Li-fu, who came Canton represent Generalissimo at funeral Tai Chi-tao,62 asked me to call and I did so. Tai Chi-tao, he says, died of overdose sleeping tablets. Chen does not think it was suicide.

Chen was interested in knowing progress negotiations North Atlantic Pact (I told him we were sanguine such a pact would be negotiated) and inquired whether something similar couldn’t be arranged for Pacific. (I explained that the situation was different.) He then came to real reason for wanting see me which was to inquire whether our China policy remained unchanged. I assured him it did and in answer to his further queries reiterated our disappointment at failure of China to take advantage of aid previously given and expressed doubt that Congress would vote material additional aid unless there was good reason to believe aid would be put to useful purpose. Covering much of the old ground, I let him understand that main task was China’s and all we could possibly do with best of good will was to help. He seemed to appreciate justice of my argument and went on to query reason behind obvious British attempt to be neutral in China when Southeast Asia was so disturbed and would be more so with a Communist-dominated China.

Admitting that peace negotiations were a farce, he asked how long they should be continued. That decision, I replied, was one solely for Chinese determination.

Chen said he had seen wire from peace mission in north to Acting President reporting friendly reception, yet mere promise to pass on Li’s proposals to higher authority. Chen said sole purpose of peace delegation was to persuade Communists fix place and date for negotiations. Li, of course, had agreed to Mao Tse-tung’s eight points as basis for such negotiations. Shao Li-tze has been to Shihchia-chuang and seen Mao Tse-tung, Chen believed, but no report from him has come through.

Chen says there is no real disagreement between Li Tsung-jen and Sun Fo. What has happened, he says, is that Li was left in Nanking with no Cabinet to advise him or to act upon the innumerable requests he has been receiving which require Cabinet action. If the Executive [Page 141] Yuan or the key Ministers thereof could divide their time between Nanking and Canton at this stage, this situation would be remedied. Li feels he must remain in Nanking so long as efforts to negotiate peace continue, yet admits Canton is most logical place at moment for Executive Yuan to function. He hopes by some division of their time, the key Ministries can function in both places.

As background for movement Government Canton, Chen stated without qualification that Legislative Yuan, in informal meeting attended by more than a quorum on January 25 in Nanking, voted move Canton. It was only the next day, January 26, that Executive Yuan with Li Tsung-jen present at discussion and agreeing, decided that Government should move Canton. These decisions were taken under imminent Communist attack on Nanking. When Communists suddenly halted and attack no longer seemed imminent, Legislative Yuan members became reluctant leave Nanking and move Canton where housing is inadequate and cost of living many times greater than in Nanking. They realize that eventually they will have to repair to Canton, but wish stay Nanking long as possible, hoping against hope that Communists will not attack.

Chen is convinced Generalissimo will not return to power in near future. He sees few people in Fenghua and, according to Chen, is not interfering with Li’s activities. Chen, who is of course loyal Generalissimo supporter, insists that when peace negotiations have failed, every one must rally behind Li as the leader. Two things are essential, he said: (1) “We non-Communists must stick together”, (2) “We must find some way to continue the cooperation at present existing between Li Tsung-jen and Sun Fo”.

Sent Department, repeated Nanking 64, Shanghai 38.

Clark
  1. Former President of the Chinese Examination Yuan.