893.00/2–1949: Airgram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 4—2:18 p. m.]
A–46. Among the material on my desk this morning were two contrasting items. One was a USIS report from Washington, the tenor of which is apparent from the following excerpts: [Page 137]
“Fifty-one Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives have asked for a report on the Chinese situation by a commission of top-level military, economic and political advisers, asserting that a Communist victory in that country would be a ‘monumental and historic’ defeat for the United States and a grave threat to national security.
“In a letter to President Truman56 made public tonight, they recommend establishment of the commission and also pose seven specific questions aimed at clarification of U.S. policy toward China.57
. . . . . . .
“The letter sharply criticizes the U.S. postwar policy on China, saying it has sought a coalition between Nationalists and the Communists, which it says now has ‘proved to be disastrous’. It points to the ‘dramatic demonstration’ of the danger of such a policy as shown in Czechoslovakia, which through its coalition government ‘was drawn behind the iron curtain’.
“The letter further states that Chinese Communists seem on the verge of a victory which, in opinion of signers, would constitute not only a grave threat to the United States but a ‘defeat for the forces of freedom’.”
The other was a copy of a letter to Mr. Roger D. Lapham58 from which the following paragraphs are quoted:
“We, as a group of individual Christian citizens of Shanghai, with absolutely no political axe to grind, with no ulterior selfish ambitions, with nothing but pure Christian love for the millions of our suffering fellow-men, for whose welfare we have labored for years and will continue to strain our effort, have been watching the recent events with great anxiety and concern. We realize very keenly the critical, fluid nature of the present situation, and the great bearing on future developments of what is being done at the present juncture. We feel the urgent necessity of calling your attention to the following crucial points to which, we hope, you will give your serious and careful consideration.
- “1. The strong bonds of cordial relationship between the Chinese and the American people, built up through the record of the past decades, are still strong as ever. We would like to see these bonds further strengthened by appropriate actions on the part of the American Government.
- “2. We would strongly oppose any further military aid to any of the armies in China, and especially the proposed revival of the Flying Tigers. The whole nation is weary of war and at the point of exhaustion. Any attempt to prolong and intensify the present bloodshed and suffering on the part of an outside power will most certainly estrange the feelings of the people towards that power.
- “3. We hope that the American Government will not entertain any preconceived judgments regarding the present developments [Page 138] in China, but that it will maintain an open-minded attitude, and keep close contact with the constructive forces among the people of China, and hold its policy open for revision in the light of the changing situations.
- “4. We urge the continuance of the ECA aid to the people of China for economic recovery and rural reconstruction in all parts of the country, irrespective of the political circumstances. We hope that in so far as possible or necessary, such aid may be administered through private agencies in which there is able and honest leadership.”
The Republican Congressmen may be influenced in part by political considerations and the Chinese Christians by their special point of view. But they both illustrate how those who are equally anti-communist may disagree as to the solution. Various other evidences could be given of the haunting perplexity in determining on a wise and effective policy, consistent also with our own basic principles and global policies. Whatever recriminations may be indulged in as to the past the matter of practical interest to all is what to do about the situation now confronting us.
The assumption underlying the Congressmen’s criticisms is that the victory of Communism in China would be a threat to American security. This is unquestionably true and makes it imperative that we make no mistakes in trying to prevent this. Their implied inference is that this could be done by voting enough money and military aid to the present National Government. This is emphatically erroneous. The basic mistake would be in doing this, for our own national interest and contrary to the clearly indicated will of the Chinese people. The Chiang Government has entirely failed to hold the overwhelming popular support it had at V–J Day, despite very considerable aid from us which is still not exhausted. If we supply more such aid and do nothing else we would merely inflame the anti-American imperialism sentiment to the great advantage alike of the Communists and of the less admirable elements of a rapidly disintegrating Government.
Fortunately there is much else that we can do to prevent the catastrophe which we all fear. This should be primarily along two lines. One is a publicity campaign exposing the evils of Communism and awakening thinking Chinese to this threat to national independence and individual human rights. The other is constructive assistance to the Chinese people through reforms in the Government, national and provincial, as recommended by us; by continuation of ECA at least in JCRR;59 by special attention to Formosa; and by similar [Page 139] efforts to promote the welfare of the common people in ways that can be widely publicized. These should help to arouse a determined will among them to oppose the Communist menace under a new leadership which we could back up with all-out material and military aid.