102.22/7–3049: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 30—12:53 p. m.]
1665. McConaughy informs us by telephone that situation Consulate General Shanghai has taken adverse turn. New and vigorous direction has been introduced into mob action of ex-Navy employees. New leader, a politico apparently, has rejected all points counter-proposal suggested Embtel 1658 of July 30 to Department, sent Shanghai 919. He waives aside interest US Navy, Government and insists Consulate General must settle issue locally and promptly. Thomas is being held tonight in room first floor Consulate General virtually as hostage and efforts McConaughy to effect his release unavailing at 9:15. McConaughy who is in his office fourth floor fears the “psychological treatment” will be used on Thomas during the night to force him to agree to settlement. We have advised McConaughy to preserve his limited freedom of action and not respond to employees’ request that he join Thomas first floor trap. McConaughy feels PLA authorities Shanghai are conniving with, if not actually encouraging, mob action and present leadership; that Aliens Affairs Bureau is deferring to military in this issue.
I feel that some drastic action is required to bring an end to this unexampled treatment of an official establishment of the US Government by the de facto authority. In considering ways and means of protecting Foreign Service personnel against further pressure and threats of violence, I suggest, as one possible effective course, the prompt convening of the Security Council to consider the threat to the peace of this callous indifference on the part of the Communist authorities to safety, welfare and dignity of official representation of a sovereign state. It might be pointed out that Chairman Mao in issuing 8th point of his proclamation regarding protection of foreigners in Communist China was either insincere or is presently unable to control his underlings in Shanghai. If reference to Security Council fails to have desired effect or if USSR blocks actions, such reference would at least appear to have advantage of clearing decks for more direct, unilateral action which might subsequently be contemplated.
Sent Department; repeated Shanghai 923.