893.00/2–1449: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 15—4:23 a. m.]
[Cantel] 43. Obviously I did not make myself clear in Mytel 25, February 9 (TelCan 9, February 10). In my conversations for some [Page 128] time, the important ones having been reported to Department, I have taken the position that Chinese had no further claim on American assistance until there was evident not only the will to resist Communist advance, but also possibility of success; that main effort had to be Chinese; that all we possibly could do was to help. I have gone on to say that US was supporting resistance to communism throughout the world and that we would be unhappy with a Communist-controlled China. My Chinese friends could be sure, therefore, of sympathy in the US for any evidence continuing resistance communism in China. I have pointed out that resources of US are limited and that we have commitments in other parts of the world where our aid is being put to good use. I have said that nevertheless if there were a genuine Chinese effort to resist communism in China which gave promise of success, its leaders might reasonably expect such assistance from us as was feasible; that we didn’t want to see a Moscow-dominated Communist regime in China, and would do what we could to prevent it. I am, of course, familiar with General Barr’s estimate and bear that in mind. I know also of the unlikelihood that we could ever replace the military equipment which has passed from Nationalists’ into Communists’ hands. I have mentioned this and remarked that with the overall shortage of military equipment we could not be expected to supply more to China until there was evidence that it would be properly used.
In talking thus, I have been motivated by my understanding that US interests would be served by maintenance of friendly government in China and one whose vote on Security Council and other international organizations would be cast for the principles for which we stand rather than those of Moscow. If my reasoning is correct, any encouragement we can give to those elements still wishing to resist communism in China should be in our interests. Chen’s idea was merely that such encouragement would be more effective if publication were permitted than if my arguments were kept “top secret”. If my reasoning is incorrect, I should certainly be informed.