893.00/2–549
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 18.]
Sir: I have the honor to comment on some of the deeper implications of the catastrophic events in China which are happening so rapidly that we have been reporting them zalmost entirely by telegraph.
What we have been observing since V–J Day, and especially during the latter half of last year, is in a sense the decay of the ancient Chinese system of Government. The original urge of the Kuomintang was chiefly anti-dynastic—as had been true of the earlier Taiping Rebellion—and, although it included democratic ideas and modern reforms, these were weakened or lost in a reversal to traditional practises. In the case of Chiang Kai-shek himself there is no need to question his personal probity nor his patriotic motives, but his concepts and methods were undemocratic. There were also many in the Government of high integrity and liberal views. But the system permitted and even fostered the evils which caused its downfall. It had become so corrupt and inefficient, and had so completely lost all popular support, that there was but little hope of orderly reforms arising from within, and revolutionary outbreaks might have been expected even had there been no Communist Movement.
This had its genesis in China independent of the Kuomintang and had already attained sizeable proportions before that Party had come into power. It would doubtless have gained adherents, as in other countries, regardless of the failings of the Kuomintang. But these were effectively exploited by the Chinese Communist Party and have been an important element in its success. This is the reason why so many of the more idealistic students have been attracted to it. It will therefore serve as a catalyst in ridding China once and for all of the scholar-official privileged caste. Whether in doing so it will enforce a worse form of totalitarian despotism is now the question.
American antipathy to the evils apparently inherent in the Communist State has led us to outspoken sympathy with and generous [Page 109] assistance to the Chiang Government. But to the leader of that Government and his most ardent followers Chinese Communism was at the outset more in the nature of one more rival faction to be subdued by force—like the warlords—than a social upheaval to be neutralized by political and economic reforms. Through all the following years this factional antagonism has been intensified by personal animosities. The American policy has been sorely misunderstood as seeming to be on the side of the present-day equivalent of the rascally and reactionary mandarins of a bygone age instead of with the pioneers of a new and nobler social order. This may seem naive to us or even disingenuous, but an attempt to see it through their eyes will help to explain not only the virulence of Communist anti-American propaganda but the embittered criticism of our policy prevailing among almost all of the younger and perhaps a majority of the older nonpartisan intellectuals.
There is a poignant irony in all of this. We came into existence as a nation through a revolutionary struggle for freedom and have led the world as the defenders of political democracy and of basic human rights. Nowhere has this been more heartily acclaimed than in China. Nowhere have we given more unstinted moral inspiration and material assistance. Yet now we are being blamed by anti-Communist leaders for not coming more vigorously to their rescue, as we did against the Japanese, and by all others for strengthening a decadent feudalistic regime and by thus meddling in China’s internal affairs lengthening a devastating civil war. Our motives are also impugned as being directed against the Soviet Union rather than for the welfare of the Chinese people.
None the less we have very great assets for the impending struggle. There is an immense reservoir of good will for us among the Chinese people. We have done much through our cultural activities in China and from what they themselves have learned of our way of life to reinforce the teachings of their revered sages as to human relationships and social justice. This heritage will not fit them for meekly enduring intolerant regimentation. As they come into power the Communists will probably perpetrate their customary excesses and this will tend to alienate those not yet sufficiently indoctrinated. There will for some time be large areas on the periphery of this country where we can continue to exert our influence. The President’s Inaugural Address will have a profound effect as a declaration of the high-principled, dynamic foreign policy of the present Administration.
Acting President Li is making a brave effort to secure a negotiated peace and is thus far revealing a commendable patience and indifference [Page 110] to personal consequences. He is keeping the public fully informed and is pressing for an early settlement on behalf of the suffering people. There is a fair probability that he will be successful because of the popular desire for peace and the weakness of the Government. He hopes to make his case unmistakably clear before the Nation and the world as to whether or not Chinese Communism will agree to a reasonable peace and a truly democratic form of government. If not, he and Pai Chung-hsi will return to their native province and rally all those areas not yet subjugated in a new form of resistance depending primarily on popular support.
In any case we may expect a period of harshly dictatorial and discriminatory treatment of foreigners, especially of Americans. The Embassy is attempting to tabulate a factual record of this nature. Thus far the indications are far from reassuring—in Tsinan, Mukden, Tientsin, with ominous overtones from Peiping. Some allowance must be made of course for confusion and excessive self-assertion at the outset and for the period of nonrecognition. It will be useful to converse with the leaders when that becomes feasible and to ascertain as best we can what are their real intentions.
Meanwhile I venture to suggest an attitude of quiet and watchful reserve, with preparation for expansion of USIS12 and emphasis on the spreading of stimulating ideas and practical information rather than on money or military power. These latter may be needed later. Continuation of E. C. A. might well be kept in abeyance until they raise the issue. One possible exception might be the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in provinces not yet “liberated” where it can have immense value, both in directly improving the people’s livelihood and in educating them for democratic citizenship.
The Acting President has committed himself to long-needed governmental reforms. He should, as he is able, carry these out and make it known. If Communist administration is as oppressive as we have reason to fear it may be, it can be confidently expected that a spirit of revolt will sooner or later find concrete expression and if this is under a leadership which has popular support we can give it our unreserved assistance. Until then we can deal with the new authorities on a basis flexible and friendly but also very firm, in the assurance that our cause is right and will in time be proven so to a people as intelligent and as sympathetic to our history and principles as are the Chinese.
Respectfully yours,
- United States Information Service.↩