893.00/2–449: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 4—11:17 a. m.]
Cantel 10. Chen Tai-chu, head American Section, Foreign Office, feels peace negotiations will fail. Li Tsung-jen, he said, is making honest effort secure reasonable peace, even disregarding all-important question of “face” and that when it became abundantly clear to the public that Communists would not grant reasonable peace terms but would demand surrender there would be an effort toward continued resistance. He did not know whether Li Tsung-jen would come to Canton or go to Kweilin or whether Generalissimo might re-emerge at that time and assume leadership. It was going to be however a most critical time in history of China as offering last opportunity rally resistance on mainland.
He did not think resistance could be effective under Generalissimo or under Li and quickly discarded such names as Hu Shih and K. C. Wu as being too western. A leader was needed, he said, who could inspire confidence in the masses of Chinese people who know nothing of western culture, yet the leader must himself have knowledge of the Occident. China undoubtedly had such a person and he might emerge when peace negotiations fail if there were indication of support from US.
I told him that he as others with whom I had spoken lately put the cart before the horse. Our Congress had voted many millions for an ECA10 program contemplated to give China a breathing spell and an opportunity to help itself and the results had been most disheartening. With this experience he could not expect, I said, to have the US once again promise assistance to resistance elements which were not already organized. If those wishing to continue resistance were to organize and give even slight hope of effectiveness, I said, such elements could be sure of the sympathy of the American people Without sympathy of the American people I added that they could [not?] be equally sure of such assistance as might be feasible. I pointed out, however, our commitments in other parts of the world and [Page 107] the fact that our resources are limited. Dr. Chen agreed that this might be true, but said potential resistance elements in China were discouraged by public pronouncements of American officials such as Hoffman’s11 Shanghai press conference and the failure of Chinese efforts to obtain a restatement of our policy. They drew the conclusion that the US was indifferent toward the present regime and was prepared to deal with the Communists and recognize any government they set up. If we really do not want to see Communist government in China, we should say so publicly, he said, and announce the conditions on which we would continue aid to China. If we could find it possible to issue such a statement or in some way express publicly our hope for continued resistance in China to Communist encroachments and time the action with the breakdown in peace negotiations, Chen thought potential elements of resistance would be encouraged and the possibility of successful resistance enhanced.
Sent Department 10, repeated Nanking 10, Shanghai 7, pouched Tsingtao, Hankow, Kunming, Chungking.