23 Manhard, Philip W.: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 27—3:34 a. m.]
488. ReEmbtel 100, March 24.36 Manhard yesterday asked authorities whether travel pass Mukden yet forthcoming and was told should it wait communication from Bureau Public Safety.
Please correct second paragraph Contel 300, March 18 [17?]37 to read “improbability” instead of “impossibility” unnoted typing error.
Am addressing new letter Ward personally today.
Re proposal withdrawal contained Embreftel, respectfully offer observations. Governing factors, I believe, are: (1) USSR views Manchuria area as part arena struggle with Western Powers, as strategic area for Soviet expansionism, and desires, if possible, exclude US and our representatives from area; (2) Position British and French Consulates Mukden basically similar to American, difference being primarily one of degree, British and French also lacking full freedom movement and facilities for communication with Governments through confidential mails and confidential codes (French Consul [at] Peiping who had been receiving letter weekly from Mukden colleague says he has received none for 2 weeks, British Consul received Mukden mail today); (3) Position Consulates here very similar to those Mukden and with hypothetical closing this radio station now it would be closer yet to Mukden isolated state (French Vice Consul Perrouche has been waiting in Shanghai for some time to return Peiping).
Believe Mukden is to be viewed as outpost in present struggle against USSR, that withdrawal would (1) lose US observation post of considerable importance and (2) possibly seriously weaken position other Consulates Communist area particularly Peiping, Tientsin. In circumstances I should propose: (1) representations along lines indicated Contel 475, March 2438 re position Consulate Generals, (2) consultation at same time with other concerned powers re Mukden and North China situation, (3) joint démarche if individual representations fruitless, either (a) before United Nations or (b) by ultimatum of sorts accompanied by implicit threat economic sanctions (this latter procedure in my opinion should be adopted only after sufficient time had been given for Communist foreign policy to develop further, my feeling being that it now is in process development), and (4) in absence favorable Communist action, joint action to withdraw Consulates if it seems absolutely necessary but at any rate to bring real economic pressure to bear on Communists. (Note Communist economic [Page 950] difficulties already reported by Tientsin, Peiping.) In event success re Mukden, I feel proposal re-open Changchun and/or Harbin would be warranted.
Chou En-lai39 reported to have expressed opinion after his return Peiping Communist attitude vis-à-vis foreigners Peiping (particularly) mistaken. Chou was reported some months ago (source now forgotten) to have contended in Community councils that CCP should incline toward USA rather than USSR, because in event war USA would win, but is said to have lost argument to those favoring USSR alignment. One way or another arrival here Chou and Mao40 (Contel 489, March 2641) will probably bring new developments for foreigners.
Repeated Nanking, Canton, Shanghai.
- Same as telegram No. 644 from the Ambassador in China, p. 948.↩
- Same as unnumbered telegram from the Consul General at Peiping, p. 947.↩
- Post, p. 1074.↩
- Member of Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.↩
- Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.↩
- Not printed.↩