125.351/9–2949: Telegram

The Consul at Dairen (Paddock) to the Secretary of State

305. After reviewing my interview with Chief Civil Administrator (Contel 303, September 27, repeated Moscow 163) and after analyzing Soviet and Chinese policy subterfuges and broken promises in refusing exit visas to foreigners (re immediately preceding telegram), I am convinced real danger exists that Consulate staff unable leave Dairen “in first days of October” as promised by chief. It definitely certain Chao Shou-yu unable go under present circumstances; run-around as to exit visa already begun.

Following points pertinent:

1.
No reason why Soviets should ask us await some particular future ship as foreign freighters in harbor now.
2.
No reason why chief should be unwilling give details re this ship; as result we completely in Soviet hands as to “unforeseen delays”.
3.
No way for Soviets to know now if captain of this ship is willing and able take passengers.
4.
Most important is subject of exit visas for foreigners. My opinion is that relations between Soviets and local Chinese have become so “touchy” on this matter that Soviets may well believe only way to escape difficulties with Chinese is to postpone departure for all foreigners for time being; this may well include us.
5.
No indication what future of Dairen will be after CCP government formed. Press states Chairman of PA–D Executive Administration exhorted Dairen Municipal Conference to be prepared obey gladly all laws of new government as soon as it formed. I cannot emphasize too much that all evidence indicates Chinese police will deal harshly both with Chinese and American members of staff. American Government’s helplessness re Mukden staff has provided good propaganda for CCP prestige; similar prolonged situations perhaps of value to Communists and Soviets here.

[Page 922]

To prevent any chance of Consulate staff remaining here beyond next week, it is recommended Department act on top priority basis along following lines:

1.
If Department has itself definite information (that is, no need to query various posts) of foreign freighter arriving Dairen harbor by October 4, Department is requested to establish by wireless with captain that he agrees to accept Consulate staff as passengers; it is necessary to agree before arrival as once in Dairen he isolated like American Consulate.
2.
If no information of such ship at Department or if no agreement with captain in 24 hours, Department is requested to instruct Seoul arrange special freighter to come Dairen in order arrive here by October 4. Unimportant how small ship may be.
3.
Department is requested have Moscow Embassy inform Foreign Office (and Consulate do same Chief Civil Administrator) along following lines:
(a)
Department appreciates assurances of Chief Civil Administrator that local Soviets will facilitate departure of Consulate staff and that it will arrange evacuation in first days of October.
(b)
However, it noted that Soviet plans as reported to American Consulate are vague—no specific information re name or destination of vessel, no assurances as to exemption of official mail or personal baggage of officers, no assurances of permit for Chao Shou-yu accompany.
(c)
Department reiterates its position that USSR as military occupying power of Dairen with [apparent omission] and for exemption customs examination.
(d)
Because it seems no definite arrangements yet made for transport of Consulate staff from Dairen, Department has itself arranged for special ship to call at Dairen by October 4 to evacuate Americans and Chao (or else has arranged with captain of freighter to accept staff as passengers).

If impasse should then arise that Soviets refuse admit ship or allow us board it or refuse departure of Chao, it will be necessary for Department finally to take definite and public stand on status of Dairen. It realized Department’s ability protest behalf Consulate weakened by not raising issue when Soviets first claimed no responsibility when Chinese police began persecution of Consulate. A review of Contels will show, however, that Soviet position at Dairen is highly vulnerable and that Department should be able exploit it effectively.

Sent Department 305, Department pass Moscow 165.

Paddock