501.BB Korea/2–949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the American Mission in Korea (Gardiner)1
| Participants: | Mr. Patrick Shaw, Australian Delegate of UNCOK |
| Mr. A. B. Jamieson, Australian Alternate Delegate of UNCOK | |
| Mr. John J. Muccio | |
| Mr. John P. Gardiner |
(I believe that Mr. Shaw had been with Mr. Muccio for some five minutes before I entered the room and, therefore, this memorandum of conversation covers only that portion of conversation which took place while I was present.)
Mr. Shaw asked Mr. Muccio his opinion as to the value of the presence of the UNCOK in Seoul.2 Mr. Muccio said that he felt that its presence was extremely valuable and that the Korean Government and the people of South Korea expected great things of the Commission. He went on to say that the interest of the Korean Government in the proceedings at Paris, during the early part of December,3 was most pronounced and that he felt that the mere presence of the Commission here in Seoul would act as a deterrent to any armed action which the Korean People’s Republic might contemplate against the South. He said further that the Korean Government had been extremely gratified with the position taken by the Australian Government in Paris when it joined with the United States and China in sponsoring the Joint Resolution, which was eventually adopted by the General Assembly.
Mr. Shaw said that the Australian Delegation felt very strongly that the Commission should swing into action and not just sit here and do nothing. He said that he felt that the Indian Delegate would support the Australian position in its desire to have action, but that some of the other delegates were inclined to be rather lackadaisical about the matter. He went on to say that at the Commission’s second meeting, which was scheduled for today, that he would attempt to spur the Commission into positive action of some sort.
Mr. Shaw inquired whether Mr. Muccio felt that Korea could continue to exist in its present divided state without continued U.S. economic aid being furnished to South Korea. Mr. Muccio said that he did not believe that South Korea could possibly continue without U.S. economic aid. The unusually good harvest of 1948 was more than offset by the tremendous number of refugees and repatriates who had [Page 954] entered South Korea after 1945—that with this greater number of persons to feed, that there would be little, if any, surplus of food stuffs for export which might bolster up the foreign exchange position of South Korea.
Mr. Shaw asked Mr. Muccio’s opinion as to the advisability of the Commission attempting to enter North Korea. Mr. Muccio said that he felt very strongly that an attempt should be made, which he thought would be valuable, even in case of a refusal. He said that he felt it was quite possible, if properly handled, that the People’s Republic would not dare to block the entrance of the Commission. Mr. Muccio suggested that the Commission attempt to get into North Korea by ship, and pointed out that there was fairly regular traffic between Hong Kong and North Korea. He went on to say that he had suggested in a cable to the Department that the Commission should attempt to enter North Korea by sea. Mr. Shaw suggested that it might be possible to get across the 38th parallel by jeep. Mr. Muccio said he saw no objection to trying. In fact the Commission might sidestep the rather knotty problem of officially informing the People’s Republic of their desire to inspect North Korea and simply arrive at the 38th parallel and attempt to enter without any previous official pourparlers.
Mr. Shaw asked if there was any tendency toward fusion between the economies of both North and South Korea, which would strongly promote integration of the two systems. Mr. Muccio said that in his opinion each was complementary to the other. Mr. Muccio went on to say, in his opinion, there was considerable amount of unofficial trade (smuggling) going on between the two and some official trade. The U.S. Government had done all it could to encourage trade between the two sections but had not been too successful—the Department of Commerce of the Korean Government initially having acted in such a way as to reduce official trade between the two sections to a minimum. The South had sent a Korean ship, loaded with rubber and cotton to North Korea—this material was to be bartered for fertilizer. This ship had arrived in North Korea three weeks ago and to date had not been permitted to leave.
Mr. Shaw asked Mr. Muccio if the Korean Armed Forces were at present well enough organized to prevent an armed invasion from the North. Mr. Muccio indicated his belief that such was not the case. He said that the basic training of the Korean Constabulary would be completed by the end of March, with battalion regimental training about the first of June. Mr. Muccio said that prior to Yosu,4 the Constabulary had been pretty thoroughly infiltrated but that since that time the Korean Government had been taking rigorous corrective action. Mr. Muccio went on to say that prior to Yosu the Korean Government [Page 955] and many people in South Korea wished to have the U.S. Army leave immediately. Also, prior to Yosu, South Korean internal politics were in a most chaotic state. The events at Yosu, however, seemed to steady the South Koreans down and apparently shocked them into a realization of what could happen, unless they developed a certain amount of team work. As a result, the friction between President Rhee and the Assembly was certainly reduced while the South Korean attitude toward the U.S. underwent a drastic change—from being rather unfriendly to a most friendly one.
Mr. Shaw stated that he felt that a certain amount of socialization on a broad basis in South Korea would tend to give South Korea a stable position. Mr. Muccio did not directly agree with this statement of Mr. Shaw, but added that the U.S. Government authorities had effected a substantial distribution of land to the peasants last April and he felt that this, more than any other single thing, had a very beneficial effect on South Korean politics. He called Mr. Shaw’s attention to the greatly increased number of children in school, there being five times as many as there were at any time during the period of Japanese control. Mr. Muccio said that he felt that, under the circumstances, the Korean Government had done a very good job of holding itself together and getting things done—that, in view of the fact that it really had been operating on its own for only about two months, it had done a good job in the face of great difficulties.
Mr. Shaw asked Mr. Muccio if he had much information on what was going on in North Korea. Mr. Muccio said that we really did not have very much to go on, we had a general idea that the North was pretty well depopulated with people refugeeing to the South and other Koreans being sent to Russia. He said that the Russians had taken out tremendous stocks of supplies as well as considerable amounts of machinery.
Mr. Shaw said that the first meeting of the Commission, which was held on February 2nd, took up matters of procedure only and that, as he had stated previously, he intended to try to get some action at the Commission’s meeting which was taking place at eleven o’clock today.
(Mr. Jamieson entered the room at this point).
Mr. Muccio asked Mr. Shaw and Mr. Jamieson if they were satisfied with their quarters. Mr. Shaw said that they were not “too flossy” but that he really couldn’t complain.
Mr. Muccio invited both Mr. Shaw and Mr. Jamieson to the luncheon which he was holding in honor of Secretary Royall on February 8th.5
- Transmitted to the Department as enclosure 2 to despatch No. 59, from Seoul, dated February 9 and received in the Department on February 22.↩
- See the editorial note under date of February 2, supra.↩
- Reference is to Part I of the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 947.↩
- Mr. Royall visited Korea as part of a Far East inspection tour.↩