Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of the Army (Royall)¹

top secret

[Seoul,] February 8, 1949.

Participants:	President Syngman Rhee
	Secretary Royall
	Mr. Muccio

At the request of President Rhee, Mr. Muccio and I conferred with the President this afternoon. He stated that, in an effort to avoid an open conflict on the 38th Parallel, the police rather than the constabulary were stationed along the line. As a result of the police being armed only with carbines, they were easy targets for the North Koreans who had rifles; and many police had been killed by rifle fire. He stated that a Colonel Price² had made the decision for the police not to have rifles on the frontier. At the time he (Rhee) understood the reason for it, but it turned out to be a mistake. He stated he would like the police to have enough rifles to keep 18–20 thousand on the northern border supplied with rifles and ammunition. (I understand they have a few machine guns or automatic rifles.)

Rhee further said that none of the disturbances which had been given so much publicity were alarming to him.

He stated that he had said some months ago that, with sufficient equipment, the Southern Korean Army could be increased by 100,000 within six weeks; that he had not publicly given the reason for the statement, but that the reason was that there were between 150,000 to 200,000 Southern Koreans, not now in the Army, who had considerable combat experience with the Japanese or with the Chinese, and that most of them would like to come into the Army, and that he would have no trouble in raising 100,000 trained soldiers immediately.

He stated that he had discussed their use with General Coulter,³ and that General Coulter had expressed some doubts about use of former Japanese soldiers because of American sentiment against it. Coulter had also said that use of ex-Japanese soldiers would create a morale factor with the Korean troops who had been hostile to the Japanese. General Coulter further thought that it would be bad to put the ex-Japanese or the ex-Chinese soldiers in separate units. The President admitted that soldiers who had fought with the Chinese and soldiers who had fought with the Japanese might have some hostility toward each other, but he felt that by the general distribution within the Army that no real problem would be raised.

The President also stated that the police were well trained militarily and were in his opinion almost ready to supplement the army as soldiers.

As to the morale of his army, the President stated the North Koreans had a much greater morale problem than the Southern Koreans, and that he believed that if North Korea were invaded by South Korea, a large proportion of the North Korean Army would desert to the South Korean Army. When asked why he thought so, he said that the North Koreans actually knew how Communism was working and many were hostile to it, while the Communist sympathisers among the Southern Koreans based their sympathy not on knowledge but on propaganda.

He said he would like to increase the Army, provide equipment and arms for it, and then in a short time move north into North Korea. He said that the United Nations’ recognition of South Korea made it legal to cover all Korea and that he saw nothing could be gained by waiting. The Ambassador injected the thought that in his (the Ambassador’s) opinion no such action should be taken certainly until there was an opportunity to work matters out peacefully with North Korea, as to which the Ambassador had some hope.

I told the President that, of course, no invasion of North Korea could in any event take place while the United States had combat troops in Korea, and that his suggestion was in my opinion tantamount to a request that we should have all American combat troops removed. The President stated that, if we would increase the Advisory Mission to a reasonable extent and put in charge of it an experienced military man who would instill confidence into the Koreans, and exert influence on the possible enemy, and if we would agree to provide a reasonable amount of additional arms, he would have no objection to us getting out at once.

He called to my attention the fact that a resolution had been introduced in the Korean Assembly a few days ago, with signatures of 75 members, asking for all foreign troops to be withdrawn, and that he and his cabinet had worked against the resolution largely because, with the Russians already out, it would be a criticism of the United States; and that by dint of hard work the resolution was defeated 106 to 32, with a number abstaining from voting.

The President stated that one of the principal difficulties of the entire Korean^* situation was the vacillation of the U.S. State Department, which vacillation he thought that had played a strong part in the loss of China, and might be seriously harmful in Korea. I told him that I thought he was quite unjust to the State Department, that every country was inclined to consider only their own particular problem, which in comparison with world affairs might be minor; but the State Department had to deal with the entire global situation as it affected America and world peace and had to make decisions from time to time on that basis, and that while I knew of no change in Korean policy, the world wide situation, which was not always static, sometimes required a change in policy as to a particular country. He stated that he understood what I said, and hoped that I did not feel that he had spoken improperly.

It seems to me that if we are going to capitalize as much as possible on the Russian withdrawal from Korea as one of the reasons or occasions for our withdrawal, we ought to withdraw promptly. I certainly do not feel we should wait until 10 May.

[Annex]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Representative in Korea (Muccio)¹

top secret

[Washington,] February 25, 1949.

Participants:	Secretary Royall
	Under Secretary Draper
	Mr. Muccio

In reply to Secretary Royall’s inquiry, I explained that the State Department had not yet defined its position on the question of withdrawal. Secretary Royall stated that he was for immediate withdrawal of the task forces and that President Rhee had agreed thereto. I recalled that, at our meeting in Seoul, President Rhee eloquently pleaded for more arms and equipment. Secretary Royall then pointedly asked if we should increase the advisory mission and if we should provide a reasonable amount of additional arms, would he object to the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. forces. To this President Rhee hardly said “yes” and hardly said “no”. Therefore, the phrase in the Secretary’s “Memorandum of Conversation”, dated February 8, 1949, that President Rhee “would have no objection to us getting out at once”, in my recollection, is somewhat too specific.

As regards my personal position, I replied that it was still as outlined at the time of the Secretary’s visit to Korea. The best target date for the completion of withdrawal appears to be June 30, 1949 provided basic training of the Korean Army is completed as scheduled (March 31 for new enlistees and June 30 at battalion and regimental level) and arrangements are completed in the meantime to leave the Korean security forces with an adequate amount of arms, equipment and munitions. I added that the U.S. should not make any unilateral announcement as to its intention regarding withdrawal until the United Nations Commission, just arrived in Korea, has had time to appraise the situation and submit its report to the General Assembly, as called for in the Resolution of December 12, 1948. In other words, I feel that we should aim at June 30th and should review the situation in a few months, say the beginning of May.

Two other matters were discussed. I mentioned that in the course of the conversation at Seoul, President Rhee had promised that he would refrain from any action that might embarrass the U.S. position in the Far East and that he would not take any offensive military action against north Korea that might possibly embroil the U.S. forces there. This promise is so significant that it should be a matter of record. I also took occasion to clarify the allegation made by President Rhee that General Coulter had expressed doubt about the use of former Japanese soldiers because of American sentiment against it. I pointed out that several times President Rhee had pleaded for arms to equip “special” groups (one plea was for arms for some 20,000 as Japanese veterans that a Colonel Kim Wan Soo (?) had convinced Rhee were champing at the bit to defend the fatherland). General Coulter never told President Rhee not to use Japanese or Chinese trained Koreans. General Coulter and I consistently urged that such super-patriots be included in the regular Korean Army and not organized as special units. We always stressed the need of a unified Army loyal to the Korean Government and not rival units looking up to individual leaders.

Secretary Royall suggested that the points raised here be attached to his “Memorandum of Conversation” dated February 8, 1949.

1. This and the annexed memorandum of conversation were transmitted to Under Secretary of State Webb on March 3 under cover of a memorandum (not printed) by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth).
2. Col. Terrill E. Price had been Advisor to the Director of the Department of Internal Security in the United States Army Military Government in Korea from September 11, 1946, to May 20, 1948; see Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 20–22, 31.
3. Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter was Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea from August 27, 1948, to January 15, 1949; see ibid., pp. 34–35, 37.
4. Mr. Muccio’s recollection is that President Rhee’s reference at this point was to the entire Far Eastern, rather than just the Korean, situation, a recollection borne out by the context of this paragraph. [Footnote in the source text.]
1. Mr. Muccio had returned to Washington for consultations in connection with the National Security Council review of U.S. policy toward Korea.