Office of the Historian

501.BB Korea/12–2248

The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper)

top secret
Washington, January 25, 1949.

Dear Mr. Draper: Reference is made to your letter of December 22, 19481 in which you state that the Department of the Army believes that a firm decision should be made at this time to carry out that portion of the UN General Assembly Resolution of December 12, 19482 which calls upon the occupying Powers to withdraw their occupation forces from Korea “as early as practicable”, and in which, specifically, you request that the Department of State agree to the initiation of final troop withdrawal from Korea on February 1, 1949 and the completion of such withdrawal not later than March 31, 1949.

Although, as you point out, this Department’s request of November 9, 19483 for the postponement of final troop withdrawal was based primarily upon the fact that the UN General Assembly had not at that time had an opportunity to consider and take action upon the Korean problem, and although the General Assembly, in its Resolution of December 12, 1948, has subsequently taken such action, other developments have in the meantime served to underline the grave risks which the United States would incur in completing the withdrawal of its occupation forces from Korea at the present time. You will recall that on November 12, 19484 Ambassador Muccio recommended the postponement of final troop withdrawal for “several months” on the basis of his belief that “under existing conditions only Army presence guarantees minimum Korean external and internal security which is indispensable for any attack [on] basic policy and economic problems and for successful economic rehabilitation”. Concurrently, official representations were received from the Korean Government requesting that the United States retain an occupation force in Korea “for the time being.5” Implicit in both of these developments is a recognition of the fact that conditions of stability and public order in south Korea are still not such as to give assurance that the Government of the Republic of Korea, with the means presently available to it, could [Page 945] withstand on its own a serious and sustained challenge to its authority through external aggression or externally-inspired insurrection.

While the Department of State is in agreement with the Department of the Army as to the importance of an early decision with respect to the timing and circumstances of the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of December 12, 1948, it believes, in the light of the considerations set forth above, that such a decision should not be made until after a careful reconsideration of the entire question of the position of the United States with respect to Korea by the National Security Council. In conformity with this view, the Acting Secretary of State forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council under date of January 17, 1949 a memorandum, a copy of which is attached,6 requesting that the Council undertake as a matter of urgency to reappraise, and if necessary redefine, the position of the United States with respect to Korea.

Sincerely yours,

Charles E. Saltzman
  1. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 1341.↩
  2. See bracketed note, ibid., p. 1334.↩
  3. See letter of November 9, 1948, ibid., p. 1324.↩
  4. See telegram 197, November 12, 1948, ibid., p. 1325.↩
  5. See ibid .↩
  6. Not printed.↩