Office of the Historian

740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2549

The Secretary of the Army (Royall) to the Secretary of State

top secret
Washington, January 25, 1949.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On 22 December 1948 I wrote to you1 recommending that we decide upon the date of 31 March 1949 for completion of withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Korea except for those to remain as part of diplomatic mission. After informal discussion of this subject between officials of the Department of the Army and the Department of State, it was agreed that a jointly prepared message be dispatched by the Department of the Army to General MacArthur to obtain his views with respect to the overall impact of early troop withdrawal from Korea particularly as it affects the U.S. position in Japan.

I enclose a copy of General MacArthur’s reply2 in which he recommends [Page 946] that for psychological reasons May 10th be the terminating date for withdrawal. Particularly significant is a statement to the effect that the longer U.S. forces remain in Korea the greater [the] risk of being placed in position of effecting withdrawal under conditions amounting to direct pressure rather than as a voluntary act. Damage in such event might well be irreparable.

In light of the State Department’s questions on this matter, and General MacArthurs carefully supported recommendation, the Department of the Army reconsiders its proposal of 22 December and recommends that a decision be made at once to complete the withdrawal of our military forces on 10 May.

For administrative reasons it is extremely desirable that a firm date be fixed immediately, and I am extremely desirous of settling this matter before my departure to see General MacArthur. I understand that the Department of State intends to present this problem to the N.S.C. and in such case suggest that we discuss the matter at the special meeting on Thursday, 27 January.

Sincerely yours,

Kenneth C. Royall
  1. Not printed, but see the letter of the same date by Mr. Draper to Mr. Saltzman, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 1341.↩

  2. Not printed. General MacArthur’s views, contained in Department of the Army telegram CX 67198, January 19, are summarized in Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KM AG in Peace and War (edited by Walter G. Hermes), a volume in the United States Army Historical Series (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 37.

    General MacArthur felt that “the United States did not have the capability to train and equip Korean troops to the point where the Koreans would be able to cope with a full-scale invasion accompanied by internal disturbances fomented by the Communists. If a serious threat developed, the United States would have to give up active military support of the ROK [Republic of Korea] forces.…”(Ibid.)

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