851G.01/6–1749: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India
430. Dept recently despatched Paris for delivery FonOff memo commenting on Mar 8 agreement. Memo expressed view success Bao Dai solution depends first instance upon readiness French provide him [Page 60] with means satisfying aims nationalist majority Vietnam, that if requisite French concessions forthcoming and Viet govt formed under Mar 8 agreement evidences capacity rally support substantial percentage Viets such govt would have grounds for appealing for support free nations, which US hopes would be generally heeded. Should French govt and Viet govt envisaged Mar 8 agreement make success this venture, US with expectation coordination British would seek obtain backing other south Asian govts and itself lend support including recognition new regime and extension such assistance as possible in circumstances. Other hand, should French and Viet govts fall short what incumbent upon them, US would refrain from supporting Bao Dai solution and it would be clear as to why US unable prevent Commie control Vietnam.
Memo will be delivered only orally and in part as Emb Paris reports its delivery at this time would impede rather than encourage French to move along lines Dept desires.
Before receipt urtel 684 Jun 17 Dept had been hopeful it might be possible induce Indian Govt take action somewhat along line British as expressed in London’s tel 2342 Jun 17,1 repeated to you as 59. As this now seems impossible, Dept would appreciate your personal views without consultation GOI soonest on possibility that an arrangement might be made, possibly with you as “honest broker”, whereby in return for public expression of encouragement for Bao Dai experiment from India, French might be induced make some conciliatory move re their colonies India.
You are of course authorized to proceed along lines suggested final para urtel 684 as soon as possible in order that Indian Govt may have text statement (final corrections on which will follow shortly) and explanation our position before statement made to press. Time and manner issuance not yet final but probably will be issued in press conference by Dept spokesman next week. You may also use as you deem advisable info contained in tels which have been repeated to you.
In explaining our position to GOI, you may point out that failure Bao Dai experiment may well result shortly in Commie control IC; that US recognizes Mar 8 agreement far from model arrangement between metropolitan power and colonial area, but that in view internal political practicalities, France, this accord represents for moment maximum concessions which Fr govt could make; that Bao Dai, with all his frailties, represents only personage visible at present about whom Vietnamese nationalists may group. You may also point out that Ho Chi Minh has long record as agent of third international including service Soviet Consulate Canton 1925 under Borodine, was [Page 61] organizer IC Communist Party and that his recent actions have not changed Dept’s belief that he remains Commie.
You may state that US regards Mar 8 agreement as only first step in evolution Vietnam problem and that we believe in time French will have to move far beyond concessions contained therein to accommodate nationalist aspirations Vietnamese people.
For urinfo, Dept planning approach Thai and Philgov with view to obtain some public expression encouragement for Bao Dai solution.2