851G.01/6–1749: Telegram
The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State
566. Our information based Hunter’s1 recent talk with High Commissioner, General Revers, head Sûreté and of DEC, other French officials, businessmen and conservative Vietnamese, plus my own conversations here with members French Embassy, causes us view with serious misgiving Department’s proposal issue statement to press before Bao Dai Government set up and functioning. While we also hopeful Bao Dai successful setting up liberal government which will rally support Vietnamese people, our misgivings based following brief estimate situation:
- 1.
- Statements made to Hunter by Pignon and others and to me by French Embassy officials here indicate Bao Dai having very serious difficulty forming cabinet due reluctance important, capable Vietnamese join his cabinet.
- 2.
- Extent support Bao Dai from public and men of influence unknown, but judging from meager interest thus far displayed by public [Page 59] in Saigon, elsewhere Indochina and Bao Dai’s difficulties getting good men for cabinet, present Vietnamese support Bao Dai exceedingly limited.
- 3.
- We believe full import March 8 agreements and subsequent protocols between French and Bao Dai not entirely clear.
- 4.
- Ability and desire French particularly in Indochina to implement agreements and actually turn over effective control to Bao Dai not clear. As Department aware, agreements, generally speaking, strongly opposed by French colonial functionaries, Indochina, and by vested business interests. Therefore, while High Command French Government no doubt seriously desirous fully implementing agreements entirely possible their efforts sabotaged by above mentioned groups.
In these circumstances, we feel very strongly inadvisable US Government give such fulsome endorsement Bao Dai before his government actually set up and functioning and particularly before some indication degree popular support. We believe such course unwise, if not dangerous, firstly, because Bao Dai Government may speedily be shown ineffectual without popular support and merely puppet government of French; secondly, because French colonial officialdom Indochina may succeed sabotaging French Government’s good plans and intentions; thirdly, issuance statement this time might conceivably react very unfavorably and give impression we committing ourselves full support French and Bao Dai without waiting see success Bao Dai’s efforts and implementation French promises. I earnestly urge therefore no statement be issued at this time but if at a later date it is clear Bao Dai Government has reasonable chance success Department give consideration issuance carefully worded statement at that time. If text proposed statement Deptel June 14 [15?], 2 a. m. is used that time, might I suggest revision second paragraph somewhat along following lines,. “US Government hopes agreements March 8 between President Auriol and former Emperor Bao Dai will be fully and expeditiously implemented in order legitimate aspirations Vietnamese people may be realized and peace, prosperity restored people Vietnam. [”]2
- Lt. William H. Hunter, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in Thailand.↩
- Repeated by the Department in telegram 104, June 20, 3 p. m., to Saigon and in 2186 to Paris. In despatch 32, June 30, from Hanoi, Consul Gibson pointed out some factors favorable to the Bao Dai solution. (851G.01/6–3049)↩