851G.01/6–2149: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
697. (1) I had long talk with Bajpai1 afternoon June 20 regarding Vietnam. I told him frankly your hopes and concern and stressed that failure new regime obtain wide support people of country would almost inevitably result in eventual Communist conquest. Communist control would open way for Communists to Siam and other southern Asian areas. I handed him latest available draft our proposed announcement and said my government sincerely hoped, in view all circumstances, responsible Indian leaders would not for time being make any statements or take any action which would make more difficult success new regime. I said we realized unless French could by acts convince nationalist majority Vietnam that requisite concessions would be forthcoming, present experiment would fail. We were hoping enlightened policy on part of French and Bao Dai would gain support of real nationalists and separate them from present Communist leadership.
(2) Bajpai replied:
- (a)
- So far as he knew, there was no intention on part Nehru or other Indian leader to make public statement or take other action regarding present situation Vietnam. An announcement might of course result raise inquiries which must be answered. He would discuss question at once with Prime Minister to ascertain if it would not be possible for GOI at least to reserve for present its position regarding Bao Dai. He would inform me Nehru’s reaction.2
- (b)
- Difficult for GOI to make decisions since French Government has not enlightened GOI regarding its plans in Vietnam, and GOI has no information other than that appearing in press.
- (c)
- He was afraid such expressions “progressive realization” contained in our proposed announcement would not appeal to Indian public since British in their documents 30 years ago continually used expressions like “progressive steps direction self-government.” There was feeling in India use word “progressive” by colonial powers, unaccompanied by listing of measures and dates, was a rather worn device for doing nothing.
- (d)
- It might be helpful if in talks with press following issuance of announcement, Department spokesman could stress informally somewhat more explicitly Department’s understanding that there were to be in Vietnam orderly developments which would satisfy legitimate aspirations people.
- (e)
- Regardless attitude GOI, he had grave doubts French would be sufficiently intelligent to follow policy in Vietnam which would gain support of population.
(3) I referred to elections yesterday in Chandernagore and asked if relations with French had improved. He replied affirmatively, but said French colonial office was nevertheless backward and stubborn. India sincerely wished to maintain good relations with French. However, no Indian Government could afford, for internal or external reasons, take any action which might be interpreted as supporting continued control by colonial powers of Asian peoples.
(4) Our conversation confirmed my views expressed Embtel 893, June 20.3 Unless French really intend take measures progressively place power in hands Vietnam people and convince GOI in Paris or Saigon of their intentions, GOI will probably, at sometime not distant future, condemn Bao Dai regime as fraud.
Sent Department 697; repeated London, Paris, Saigon.
- Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.↩
- In telegram 704, June 22, 8 a. m., from New Delhi, Ambassador Henderson reported a note from Sir Girja confirming the oral remarks and advising the French to inform India urgently of their intentions respecting Indochina (851G.01/6–2249).↩
- Not printed.↩