Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine(E)/10–1849: Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

restricted
priority

Beirut, October 18, 1949—noon.

549. Simes 19. [From Clapp.] Future organizational plans:

1. To clarify background suggestions which follow, appears advisable stress points on which ESM thinking at variance with Department.

(a) Funds required by long-term development body for first year’s operations not likely exceed $5,000,000; mostly required to bridge present gaps between preliminary general surveys and saleable engineering plans. Presently countries possess volumes of engineering reconnaissance and generalized analysis, but no specific engineering work of the nature, required to make a project saleable or bankable. Governments here inexperienced in such matters, and guidance for considerable time required to bring schemes to point where positive action on complex project can be recommended. Therefore, for fiscal 1951, unnecessary and undesirable seek long-term development on modest scale. When November field work completed, ESM may be prepared to recommend more funds sooner.

(b) ESM can report continued progress in relationships with Syrian, Lebanese, Jordan Governments, but only because has studiously avoided pressure on resettlement. Opinion in Arab states remains so violently opposed to abandonment of rights of refugees to repatriation in Palestine that contemplation by Governments of settling them elsewhere would likely make governments more shaky. Practical advantages of local public works to prevent further deterioration morale, to cause added mobility in refugee populations, and to secure direct benefits from projects constructed, suffice to make such limited programs acceptable, and their effect will undoubtedly be to achieve in part the objective of resettlement but through choice of individual refugees. However, whatever ESM or its successors in the near future can accomplish will depend on the divorce of its activities, in Arab eyes, from any connection with political settlement of the Palestine war. ESM firmly of opinion that necessary connection between economic development activity and political conciliation should only take place at seats of government of interceding powers, and that consolidation in field, under agent general or other aegis, is unnecessary and doomed to frustrate economic approach.

2. Referring Department document suggesting NESDA¹ and September 23 paper headed Palestine Political and Refugee Problems, following are ESM views:

(a) Agreed consolidation of PCC political operations under agent general sound. However, for reasons above-stated and in line with planning later set forth in this cable, would delete references in September 23 draft to relief, and to development. Agent general, representative of SYG, would be co-ordinate with chairman director of EFINDI (Economic and Financial Development Institute of Near East—have other suggestions on title) whose functions outlined below.

(b) While ESM finds much of NESDA draft acceptable, its present thinking would involve recommending the following steps:

(1) Continuation of UNRPR only until April 1.

(2) Establishment early in 1950 at latest of new agency EFINDI by interested governments undertaking to contribute toward development plans of area. EFINDI’s functions in development substantially same as NESDA’s with reservations expressed Paragraph 1a this cable: further functions in regard to take over, under contract with SYG, of UNRPR operations as from April 1; planning and negotiation of arrangements for works projects with Governments; co-ordination of work of charitable agencies (the volume of whose direct assistance in meeting refugee needs has assumed very considerable proportions nearly equalling UNRPR assistance). Device of contract relationship with SYG avoids establishment of a third agency (or introduction of IRO, to which ESM opposed account IRO historical connection with Palestine immigration), permits close coordination of relief and work projects, and of work projects and developments. Hoped that SYG would agree support appeal for funds as for UNRPR for disbursement by EFINDI, but EFINDI would require authorization use such funds either for direct relief or wage payments.

3. EFINDI would endeavor work out satisfactory arrangements, at as early a date as practical, with Middle East Governments to take over relief operations from agencies, and to establish work relief projects with a view to eventual full financial as well as administrative responsibility for refugees. EFINDI would call on specialized UN agencies for assistance as appropriate in technical fields. Would start specific engineering studies forthwith.

4. Calculation under study to estimate funds required by EFINDI during calendar 1950, for relief and work relief. Very preliminary calculations indicate that costs may not exceed present UNRPR budget by amounts that appear unmanageable.

5. Have given only preliminary consideration methods staffing EFINDI. Most workable proposal yet suggested is to employ director and staff through member governments, and arrange detail of technicians when required from UN or UN specialized agencies. In many of its functions, EFINDI would fit US Point 4 plans and UN plans for technical assistance.

Have discussed foregoing with Morton and Labonne, and suggest Department take up with British and French. Would appreciate Department’s views on including Turkey in these considerations. While financial stake Turkey would obviously be small, there are advantages to increased interest. Consul general has been helpful colleague, and Turk’s presence EFINDI could help Arab states and improve Turk’s relationships Near East neighbors.

We are revising NESDA September 29 draft and Palestine September 23 draft to reflect above changes. Will telegraph or mail revision end of week. [Clapp.]

Pinkerton

1. Possibly the draft to be submitted to Mr. Clapp; see Mr. McGhee’s memorandum of September 26 to Mr. Rusk, p. 1403.