Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

¹

Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States²

top secret

Washington, October 17, 1949.

NSC 47/2

The Problem

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow toward Israel and the Arab States, with particular reference to problems arising out of the recent hostilities in Palestine.

Analysis

2. The United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with provision for economic union between them. It also recommended that Jerusalem be established as a corpus separatum administered by the United Nations. With the termination by the British Government of its mandate over Palestine on May 15, 1948, a provisional government of a state of Israel assumed power. The proclamation creating Israel did not define its boundaries, although the concurrent Israeli request for United States recognition referred to the boundaries set forth in the General Assembly resolution of November 29.

3. The Arabs of Palestine as well as the governments of the Arab states of the Near East rejected the General Assembly partition resolution, and no government was established for the Arab portion of Palestine as recommended by the resolution. Fighting broke out between Arab and Jewish irregular forces prior to termination of the British mandate, and, concurrently with the promulgation of the State of Israel, military forces of the neighboring Arab states entered Palestine and sporadic fighting broke out, particularly in the area between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

4. a. The area of the Jewish State as contemplated under the General Assembly resolution was approximately 5,600 square miles, the area of the Arab state 4,400 square miles. The proposed population of the Jewish state was approximately 550,000 Jews and 500,000 Arabs; that of the Arab state, 745,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews; and that of Jerusalem, 100,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews.

b. At the present time, the total area of Palestine under Israeli control or military occupation is estimated at 7,750 square miles. The present population of Israel consists of approximately 800,000 Jews and 70,000 to 100,000 Arabs. Jewish immigrants have been entering Israel at the rate of 25,000 monthly since May 15, 1948.

c. As a result of the hostilities, some 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from Israeli-controlled territory. They took refuge in areas of Palestine under Arab military occupation and in the neighboring Arab states. The Palestinian Arabs, together with the Arab populations of the independent Arab states of the Near East, number about 35,000,000.

5. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the United States took a leading part in seeking a solution of the Palestine problem which would be acceptable to the interested parties. Since the failure of these attempts, the United States has actively supported the United Nations in its efforts to end the military conflict. The United States supported the General Assembly resolution of May 14, 1948, authorizing the appointment of a United Nations Mediator charged, among other functions, with promoting peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine. It supported the Security Council resolution of May 29, 1948, calling for a cessation of hostilities for a period of four weeks and establishing an embargo on the import of arms to the Near East. After expiration of this truce period, this Government introduced a resolution, adopted by the Security Council July 15, 1948, ordering the governments concerned to desist from further military action and deciding that the truce shall remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine is reached. The United States assisted through diplomatic means the efforts of the Acting United Nations Mediator to negotiate armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states; armistice agreements have now been concluded by Israel with Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria. This Government jointly sponsored a resolution, passed by the General Assembly on November 18, 1948, establishing a United Nations relief program for Palestine refugees supported by voluntary contributions, as a means of assisting United Nations efforts towards restoration of peace in Palestine. On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly passed a resolution establishing a Palestine Conciliation Commission, charged with facilitating settlement of all issues outstanding between Israel and the Arab states. The Commission, composed of representatives of France, Turkey, and the United States, is currently engaged in efforts to carry out its tasks of promoting a territorial settlement for Palestine, formulating an international regime for Jerusalem, and seeking a solution to the Arab refugee problem.

6. In support of the efforts of the Conciliation Commission, the United States has made a series of strong representations to both the Arabs and the Israelis. This Government’s approach to the Arabs has been designed chiefly to induce them to accept the principle of substantial resettlement of refugees in the Arab states. The representations to Israel have been intended to convince it of the necessity of accepting the principle of substantial repatriation of refugees, and the principle of compensation to those states desiring such compensation for any territorial acquisition which Israel expects to effect outside the boundaries proposed in the partition resolution of November 29, 1947. The United States has warned Israel that if it continues to reject the friendly advice offered by this Government for the purpose of facilitating a general peace in Palestine, the United States Government will be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable.

7. a. Up to the present, United States relations with Israel have been based upon our traditional support of the aspirations of the Jewish people to obtain a national home in Palestine. In support of this policy of sympathy and friendship towards the Jewish people, the United States extended immediate de facto recognition to the new state; supported Israel’s application for a $100,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan, of which it has up to the present time drawn $51,000,000; and supported its application for membership in the United Nations.

b. The present Government of Israel is intensely nationalistic in character, and maintains an internal policy of compromise dictated by the necessity of reconciling the demands of its extremist elements with the more moderate tendencies of the government party. The necessity of maintaining this internal balance makes it difficult for Israel’s leaders to meet external demands for compromise with respect to relinquishment of territory and readmission of refugees which are essential to final settlement in Palestine. It also results in further increasing Israel’s isolation among the neighboring Arab states and in reinforcing the charges of intransigence and expansionism which have been levelled against Israel. In addition Israel endeavors to pursue a neutral course in its relations with East and West. This position of neutrality is motivated by the desire to obtain further assistance from the United States, and to retain the diplomatic support of the Soviet bloc, to obtain military material therefrom, and to facilitate immigration to Israel of Jews from Eastern Europe. In view of the delicate nature of Israel’s internal political equilibrium, the government will be subjected to increasing pressures from political radical and extremist groups to the extent that it makes concessions to the Arab states or otherwise follows policies contrary to the views of these groups.

c. The technical abilities of the Israelis, coupled with their access to Western technical and financial assistance principally from United States sources, have already resulted in much greater economic opportunities and higher standards of living in Israel than those among the neighboring peoples. In the absence of assistance to the Arab states this disparity will tend to increase in the future and to result in further tensions between Israelis and Arabs. However, Israel’s program for large-scale economic development, required to implement successfully its ambitious immigration policy, will make it dependent for the foreseeable future upon large-scale external financing through foreign capital investment, loans, and voluntary contributions. There are forces at work which may tend to reduce the rate of immigration. These forces include improved conditions in Europe, restrictions in USSR and satellite countries on emigration, relative decrease of contributions from abroad for financing immigration, and reports of increasingly difficult conditions in Israel itself. At the same time, if immigration continues at the present rate Israel may be unable, even with large-scale external financing, to improve its economic condition sufficiently to prevent political and economic instability. This would result in Israel being faced with a pressing need intensively to develop sub-marginal areas and to expand industrialization within Israel. If unsuccessful, the Israeli Government might be tempted to seek additional territory.

d. Israel’s military establishment, although small, is a relatively modern and effective fighting machine which has proved itself adequate to resist the poorly equipped, ill-trained and badly led armies of the Arab League states in the course of recent hostilities and to occupy considerable territory beyond that awarded under the partition plan. It can be expected that the future effectiveness of the Israeli Army will increase with the implementation of current plans for training and reorganization. Arab military forces reflect the weaknesses of the Arab governments in that they have demonstrated their inability to act in concert against the Israeli Army. So long as there is the present wide discrepancy between the effective military power of the Israelis and of the Arabs, there remains, in the event of failure of non-military factors to control the situation, the danger of Israeli extremist pressure to resort to military action. Moreover, in the absence of a satisfactory modus vivendi between Israel and its neighbors, Israel will be burdened by the high cost and accompanying psychological effect of maintaining a state of military preparedness which in turn will detract from the effectiveness of any economic assistance given to that country.

8. a. United States relations with the Arab states have been traditionally based upon extensive cultural, educational, and religious interests in the Near East, which have been reinforced in recent years by growing commercial and economic ties with the area, including extensive petroleum interests. The political relations of this Government with the Arab states have suffered during the past several years because of basic differences in views on the subject of the future of Palestine. Despite this serious setback to Arab-American relations, and the deep-seated suspicion of our motives which has arisen, the Arab states for the most part still desire closer relations with this Government, and have requested from the United States economic, technical, and military assistance.

b. The intense and competing nationalisms and personal and dynastic rivalries which characterize the governments of the Arab states render them incapable of working together effectively or constructively in their own best interests. For the most part their internal policies pursue a course of inaction or of endeavoring to maintain the status quo. Their relations with one another are characterized by unproductive controversies and rivalries, and their principal unity lies in their implacable animosity toward and common fear of Israel. Because of the generally inferior quality of their statesmanship, and the inertia of their to be susceptible to exploitation by extremist elements and to the imposition of authoritarian and unrepresentative forms of government. The Arab governments will, under present conditions, endeavor to resist Soviet penetration or exploitation despite their weakness, and will continue to seek a more positive Western orientation.

c. The weakness of the Arab governments is reflected throughout the area in their retarded economic and social development, which has been further aggravated by the economic dislocations arising from the recent hostilities and by the presence of the Palestinian refugees in their territory. However, in the absence of progressive or capable leadership, the ability of the Arab governments to raise the living standards of their peoples above the level at which social revolution is a recurring threat will depend upon the provision of external technical and financial assistance.

d. The respective military forces of the Arab states also reflect the weaknesses of the Arab governments. In addition to their demonstrated failure to act in concert against the Israeli Army, their ability to maintain internal security will be seriously prejudiced as long as the arms embargo is continued. Moreover, until a firm settlement is obtained in Palestine, the disproportionate emphasis upon their respective military establishments at the expense of economic and social reforms will continue to burden the Arab states as well as Israel.

9. While the Near Eastern area has become a point of major interest to the United States only comparatively recently, the United Kingdom has had important strategic, political, and economic interests in the Near Eastern area for over a century. However, the objectives of both governments are now substantially the same although there are at times differences of opinion on methods and procedures. In addition we have had divergent views from time to time on the question of the future of Palestine. Nevertheless, the desirability for a common approach to problems and collaboration wherever possible has been clearly demonstrated by the useful results of our cooperation to date, particularly since the outbreak of World War II.

10. On August 11, 1949 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution expressing the view that the armistice agreements concluded between Israel and Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria during the past six months supersede the Truce provided for in the Council’s resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948. In the United States view and in the view of other members of the Council this action brought to an end the stringent measures provided for in the resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948. Among these measures was the embargo placed on the parties to the dispute, and all other governments and authorities concerned, to refrain from importing or exporting war material and introducing military personnel into the affected area.

The United States view with regard to the export of arms to the area was expressed by Senator Austin in the Council on Thursday afternoon, August 4, as follows:

“So far as the United States is concerned, it does not intend to allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms race in the area. Export of arms to this area of the world should be strictly limited to such arms as are within the scope of the legitimate security requirements, again as recommended by Dr. Bunche. We hope that prudence will prevail not only among the parties but among all nations of the world which are in a position to supply arms and that they will pursue a policy similar to that which we intend to pursue.”

11. Analysis of the estimated funds which are likely to be available during the next few years from all sources, including both grant and loan funds, reveals that the development projects required for solution of the refugee problem will probably absorb most of the external financing available from all sources for the Near East. Therefore the questions of economic development and of solution of the refugee problem are indivisible and must be considered simultaneously and carefully coordinated.

12. Our policy toward Israel and the Arab states will be an important factor in determining whether they can be stimulated to constructive action in their own behalf to provide the basis for a stable and progressive political structure and a balanced and viable economy. If either Israel or the Arab states fail to take such action, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern area and United States national interests therein will be jeopardized.

13. In addition our policy toward Israel will be an important factor in determining whether Israeli policy with respect to Jerusalem, Arab Palestine, and the Arab states develops along aggressive or peaceable lines. If Israeli policy develops along expansionist and aggressive lines, the security of the area and United States national interests therein will be jeopardized.

14. In view of the strong passions which have been aroused, it will be many years before relations between Israel and neighboring countries can become sufficiently stable as to be proof against sudden and violent disruption. The situation, accordingly, requires careful implementation on our part, over a long period, of an objective, impartial but firm policy which will instill moderation in both parties to the controversy and help to ensure that the competing nationalisms do not get out of hand.

Conclusions

15. Our policy toward Israel and the Arab states should be based on the fundamental propositions that:

a. The political and economic stability of the Israel and Arab states is of critical importance to the security of the United States. In the NSC memorandum “Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East—Basic U.S. Position”, approved November 24, 1947, it is stated that: “The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States.”^*

b. It is in the national interest of the United States to have the respect and, in so far as possible, good will of all the peoples of the Near and Middle East, Jews and Arabs alike, and their orientation toward the West and away from the Soviet Union.

c. The differences between the new Israeli state and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and the Arab states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression.

d. We should provide advice and guidance in the solution of the economic, social, and political problems of the area on an impartial basis, as between Israel and the Arab states, contingent upon the willingness of these countries to apply the maximum of self help.

e. There should also be close United States–United Kingdom collaboration wherever possible to achieve the basic objectives. In addition the United States should bear in mind the desirability of collaborating with France and with Turkey and other Moslem non-Arab states in the area for the same purpose whenever it is feasible and practicable.

16. We should continue our efforts to achieve a settlement of the Palestine problem along the following lines, working principally through the United Nations, but supporting those efforts through unilateral action and through joint United States–United Kingdom influence where appropriate:

Immigration:

a. Israel should in its own interests, accept the principle of coordinating the flow of Jewish immigration with the developing capabilities of its economy.³

Refugees:

b. Primary responsibility should rest with Israel and the Arab states for solution of the refugee problem, aided by such outside assistance as is available.

c. In accordance with the spirit of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, Israel should accept the principle of maximum possible repatriation of refugees who so desire, should begin immediately actual repatriation on a reasonable scale within the number to be agreed in a final settlement, and should carry out such repatriation to conclusion as quickly as possible.

d. The Arab states should accept the principle of substantial resettlement in their states of the large number of refugees who do not wish or who cannot be repatriated, and should take immediate steps to initiate such resettlement.

e. We should endeavor to obtain for the refugees adequate compensation from Israel for abandoned refugee lands and property in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948, and should resist efforts by Israel or the Arab states directly or indirectly to relate the question of payment of such compensation to the question of war indemnities.

f. We should be prepared within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with policy already established, to support with financial and technical assistance a program for repatriation and resettlement, of Palestine refugees. Our contribution is contingent upon formulation of a plan which is satisfactory to us and has a reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, upon full acceptance by the Arabs and Israelis of such a program and the responsibilities involved, upon their active cooperation in carrying out the program, and upon satisfactory contributions by other interested governments.

Economic:

g. We should seek to promote economic arrangements between Israel and the Arab states such as the resumption of commercial intercourse within and through the area, uninterrupted flow of petroleum products, and uninhibited operation of and access to internal and international surface and air transport facilities.

Territories:

h. We should assist the Israelis and the Arabs to achieve a final settlement of the territorial question in Palestine by agreement or, failing that, by supporting a Palestine Conciliation Commission proposal for presentation to the parties and, if necessary, to the UN or by some acceptable modus vivendi. Although the United States would be prepared to accept a solution freely agreed to by the parties, if it is necessary for the United States to state its views, it should advance the following policy which is consistent with that approved by the President:

If Israel wishes to retain any areas in Palestine allocated to the proposed Arab state under the UN resolution of November 29, 1947 and now occupied by Israeli forces, Israel should, if the Arab states so demand, make territorial compensation elsewhere and/or make other concessions of a non-territorial character as are required to reach an equitable agreement which could provide the basis for a lasting peace.

Jerusalem Area:

i. We should support the principle of the internationalization of the Jerusalem area as defined in the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. This might be accomplished along the following lines:

(1) United Nations control of the Holy Places;

(2) Division of the Jerusalem area into sub-areas to be administered by the respective adjacent states under the supervision of the United Nations; and

(3) The establishment of obligations on the part of the adjacent states to observe basic requirements with respect to demilitarization, free access and observance of human rights, and the establishment of a system of compulsory arbitration to determine whether these obligations are being fulfilled.

17. In the light of the Security Council Resolution of August 11, 1949 and in order to promote internal security as a basis for general security in the Near Eastern area, we should permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states limited to such arms as are within the scope of legitimate security requirements.

18. We should by a policy of sympathy and firm leadership encourage Israel and the Arab states to develop friendly cooperation with the Western nations, to exclude or control subversive influences, and to achieve relations of good will and trust with one another.

19. We should endeavor to prevent discrimination against Jews in the Arab states and against Arabs in Israel.

20. Any kind of regional economic or political arrangement to include Israel and the Arab states seems now unlikely because of the dissensions and suspicions which prevail in the area, and may be quite unlikely for some time to come. However, it is a possibility which should be kept under continuing review in the light of developments in the area.

21. It is desirable that the economic opportunities of the peoples of the area should be raised above the level at which social revolution is a recurring threat. The United States should encourage the economic development and expansion of economic opportunities of the people of the area. We should, therefore, in addition to supporting a program for solution of the refugee and other economic problems, which is designed solely to restore the status quo ante, prepare or assist in the preparation of a coordinated long-range program of economic and social development for Israel and the Arab states to be implemented by both multilateral and unilateral action through (a) technical assistance; (b) loans from the United States Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; (c) grants or loans from interested UN states; (d) technical and financial assistance from appropriate United Nations agencies; or (e) a combination of the foregoing. Any U.S. or U.N. assistance under such a program should depend upon a real effort on the part of the Israel and Arab states to help themselves and each other in consonance with the principles enunciated in the above conclusions, should be coordinated with such efforts, should be designed to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between Israel and the Arab states and to integrate their economies into a broader international economy, and should allow ample and increasing scope for private enterprise.⁴

1. This lot is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
2. This paper represents a revision of NSC 47/1, dated September 1; regarding the latter, see editorial note, p. 1339.
3. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Documents Resulting from Conversations with the British in Regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”, dated November 19, 1947. [Footnote in the source text; for documentation on “The Pentagon Talks of 1947”, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.]
3. Subparagraph 16a did not appear in NSC 47/1. Subparagraphs b through h are identical with those appearing in NSC 47/1, except for the relettering of the subparagraphs.
4. The National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury adopted NSC 47/2 on October 17 and submitted the paper to President Truman “with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.” (note of October 17 by Admiral Souers). The President approved the paper on October 20 and directed its implementation along the lines of the note (memorandum of October 20 by Admiral Souers to the National Security Council. S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351).