501.BB Palestine(E)/10–149: Telegram
The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State
priority
506. Simes 9. For McGhee [From Clapp].
1. Have completed first visits to Lebanon, Egypt, Transjordan and Syria, accompanied by deputies. I explained purpose of Mission emphasizing immediate task to report and recommend to UN by November 1 (now changed) a program of works for temporary employment of able-bodied refugees where they are as a basis for discontinuing or decreasing direct relief program. Asked cooperation of governments in such program without prejudice to their positions on repatriation, compensation or resettlement. Asked for their proposals re such able and useful works projects near refugee concentrations. Offered our experts for joint consultations with understanding that exploration of long-range economic development possibilities would begin after November 1 for later report. Visits arranged in atmosphere of abating suspicion that reception of Mission would indicate weakening attitude Arab States re repatriation and compensation endorsed by UN resolution and that agreement to temporary works program would lead to resettlement without agreement by NE Governments.
Egypt—three days. Brief conference with Prime Minister who was cordial and candid re Egypt’s inability to accept refugees in overcrowded present population.1 I emphasized immediate task Mission and asked cooperation on works program in Gaza area. Conference with Liaison Committee of government developed some ideas and permission was granted our experts to inspect Gaza area to see what can be done.
Dinner with Prime Minister. Trip to desert agricultural experiment station. Fairly good press. Invited to return for visit to Aswan and other developments.
Prime Minister endorsed temporary works program for refugees and is less adamant on repatriation issue than Arab League officials in his own government.
I had most profitable conversation with Ambassador Caffery.2
[Page 1416]Transjordan—two days. Temporary works program and possible resettlement schemes freely discussed. Our experts joined us and began field trip both sides of Jordan. Government is ready to go just as far on resettlement as outside funds will permit. Desmond Morton trying to arrange immediate allocation of funds available from British loan to begin works program in Transjordan by Transjordan Government without awaiting Mission report. I have encouraged him to do so.
We had thirty minutes with King Abdullah who stated Arab case forcefully. He endorsed resettlement in Transjordan and insisted upon access to Mediterranean by means of Negev not corridor and no internationalization of Jerusalem. He had strong condemnation of UN handling whole Palestine problem including Bernadotte assassination. He hoped Mission would get action on its economic recommendations.
Syria—two days. You are familiar with difficulties in getting open door for Mission. We were well-received but with extreme caution publicly by government. We had two-hour conference with Foreign Minister Qudsi first day. He stipulated and explained conditions we must accept if government was to “permit” Mission to study possibilities in Syria. Orally conceptions seemed same as reported Keeley but because of delicate political situation of government and need for finding strong program of development helpful to resettlement in Syria, I asked to have conditions in writing for later discussion. Conditions in brief precluded any economic development studies having any relation to refugees. Keeley’s thorough briefing had prevented any unpleasant surprise in this respect.
I explained immediate need for temporary works program for refugees now in Syria and asked if his conditions precluded discussions or cooperation. I left him with clear understanding that we could not assign experts to long-range economic developments studies unless cooperation on temporary works program assured now.
Next day we had three hours negotiation with Qudsi on text of conditions. Some progress, and we adjourned until next week. Expect to get into Syria on workable basis. Government afraid to decide anything, but decree extending working rights to refugees is good sign. They want our help on long-range development but will not take position publicly that such developments will, or are intended to, facilitate resettlement, for fear this will weaken their position re repatriation and compensation. Qudsi knows land development will attract refugees but insists resettlement must be unstated corollary and not a subject for international discussion.3
[Page 1417]2. We had planned to go to Tel Aviv after Damascus and had tentative date for September 30. In meantime we received official word via British that Israel Government refused to guarantee safety of Morton, British member of ESM. I immediately called off date by cable insisting upon responsible assurance from government for Mission as whole before any date would be set. Tentative date set for October 9 at their suggestion and subject to satisfactory answer mytel re security. Prior to this interchange, Tel Aviv expressed impatience over decision to visit Arab States first. Israeli Delegation raised question with me at Lausanne and later through UN ME channels. Obvious reason for visiting Arab States first is that is where refugees are and refugees are Mission’s main problem.
3. In official talks I have evaded formula for financing temporary works except to say it would require cooperation from local governments in supply materials, tools and equipment at least. At most international assistance for wages but probably less. Believe tentatively wages must come primarily from outside. Believe tentatively operating administration of works program should be in national government with supervising auditing and full inspectional functions in international agency with power to stop funds at any time (international organization to be transitional and changeable for longer program).
4. I have held full-dress conferences at each capital. Makes American press ideal by comparison.
5. American Missions at every capital indispensable our work and helped inconspicuously in many ways. Sands4 accompanied ESM and proved indispensable.
6. Trying to arrange Baghdad visit soon.
7. Preliminary report being drafted on relief extension, temporary works and will include ideas on compensation yet to be discussed at Tel Aviv. Long-range schemes and resettlement for later report. Important to get refugees to work first.
8. Do not expect interim report before November 10.
9. PCC parentage of ESM definite handicap to Mission. Suggest you keep this in mind in considering parentage of organization to carry on economic development programs.
Sent Department, repeated Damascus 76; Department pass Cairo 52, Amman unnumbered. [Clapp.]
- Harry C. Brown, Finance Officer and Acting Head of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees office at Cairo, informed an Embassy officer that UNRPR had taken responsibility for the 5,000 to 6,000 refugees in Egypt at Kantara at the request of the Egyptian Government and had moved them to Gaza. He also stated that subsequently the Egyptian Government had made overtures requesting UNRPR to assume responsibility for the remaining Palestinian refugees in Egypt. These too were to be sent to Gaza, (despatch 881, October 1, from Cairo, 501.MA Palestine/10–149)↩
- Jefferson Caffery, who had been designated Ambassador to Egypt on July 9.↩
- Damascus, on October 10, reported that Mr. Clapp and Ms deputies met with Foreign Minister Qudsi the previous day and agreed on a satisfactory basis “for technical discussions and field inspection in cooperation with Syrian technicians re possibility temporary work projects to employ refugees. Longer range projects will be explored later probably after elections. ESM departed for Tel Aviv yesterday” (telegram 597. 501.BB Palestine(E)/10–1049).↩
- William L. Sands, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy in Lebanon.↩