Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.00/9–2649

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee)

restricted

[Washington,] September 26, 1949.

Subject: Mt. Scopus situation

We have considered Dr. Senator’s request that the US Government make representations to Jordan regarding free access to Mt. Scopus¹ but we believe that we should not take any action on this matter.

During the negotiations at Rhodes between the Israelis and Jordan, the Israelis insisted that Jordan accept certain conditions before they agreed to sign even a “cease fire.” Included in these conditions was free access to Mt. Scopus. Due to the fact that the Jordan Government wished to proceed to the armistice stage, it accepted free access to Mt. Scopus in principle.

Article VIII of the armistice agreement provided that a Special Committee would be organized to “direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following on which agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mt. Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem.”

To date the only matter that has been successfully handled by the Special Committee has been the resumption of the operation of the railroad. On all other matters the Special Committee was unable to formulate any agreed plans. The Jordan delegates, while maintaining that they still agreed in principle to free access to Mt. Scopus, were unable to reach any satisfactory agreement with the Israelis on how free access could be worked out. Mt. Scopus is a very strategic location overlooking the Old City and most of the main arteries leading to Arab Jerusalem from Jordan-controlled territory. Consequently, the Jordanians did not wish to give the Israelis complete freedom of passage without any form of control. Moreover, Jordan has also raised the question of the return of certain Arab quarters in Jerusalem which, it is assumed, were presented to the Special Committee under the phrase “such matters as either party may submit to it.”

The use of the Bethlehem road and the restoring of the electricity to the Old City are not very important to Jordan, as they have been getting along quite well without electricity and have built a secondary road to Bethlehem through Arab territory. What is important to them is the return of certain Arab quarters now held by the Israelis. Jordan is determined to make use of the Mt. Scopus situation as a bargaining point for their demands. There is nothing in Article VIII which requires Jordan to accept any “plans and arrangements” for free access to Mt. Scopus unless they agree to them. So far, Jordan has not agreed.

Because of this impasse the Department proposed to Jordan and Israel that both accept to refer matters on Article VIII, as well as the border questions involved in Jerusalem including demarcation lines, to the Mixed Armistice Commission under the chairmanship of General Riley. It was felt that Riley would be able to help the parties in “the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements” and might be able to produce compromise suggestions. Jordan accepted the proposal on the basis that it favored the return of normal life to Jerusalem. Israel accepted the proposal in principle but objected to the MAC dealing with the broader question of Jerusalem. In other words, Israel wished the MAC to consider only those points specifically mentioned in Article VIII of the armistice agreement.

Although we have pointed out to Israel on numerous occasions that acceptance of our proposal might enable the parties to settle their differences on the general subject of Jerusalem, without prejudicing the interest of the world community in the city, Israel has refused to go along with the proposal.

It is believed that it would be unwise for the Department to take any action on Dr. Senator’s request and that the question should be left to the UN and General Riley to handle as they think best.²

1. The request of David W. Senator, Vice President of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, was made in a conversation with Messrs. McGhee, Wilkins, and Stabler earlier the same day (memorandum of conversation by Mr. McGhee, 867N.4212/9–2649).
2. The Department summarized this memorandum in telegram 636, September 30 6 p. m., to Tel Aviv and instructed Ambassador McDonald as follows: “In your talks with Israeli officials re PCC Jerusalem proposals, you might find it useful to point out above situation is one more reason why necessary for Israel to adopt constructive and reasonable approach to Jerusalem question. PCC plan wld seem to offer basis on which Israeli approach might now be based.” (867N.01/9–3049)