Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

Department of Defense Files

Memorandum, by the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret

[ Washington ,] 5 May 1949.

CFP–4/6

Proposed Anglo-Egyptian Defense Discussions

Reference: CFP–4 series

1. With reference to the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on “Proposed Anglo-Egyptian Defense Discussions,”¹ (Appendix to Enclosure “B”) the Joint Chiefs of Staff previously considered it inadvisable to agree with the British Chiefs of Staff that Anglo-Egyptian defense discussions be held covering certain phases of Anglo-American plans for the defense of the Middle East. The recent memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff in the Annex to RDC 5/78 (Appendix to Enclosure “B”) indicates more specifically those points to be considered and the information to be revealed to the Egyptians in Anglo-Egyptian defense discussions.

2. In view of the statement by the British Chiefs of Staff that their minimum security requirements cannot be met under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and in view of the stated difficulties in attempting to obtain Egyptian approval to expanding existing treaty rights, I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should agree with the request of the British Chiefs of Staff in RDC 5/78 as qualified in the accompanying proposed reply to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff² (Enclosure “A”).

3. Accordingly, I recommend that the memorandum in Enclosure “A” be forwarded to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure “A”

Draft

Memorandum for the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

Subject: Proposed Anglo-Egyptian Defense Discussions

1. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff agree, except as noted in paragraph 2 below, with the British Chiefs of Staff to the two following points in RDC 5/78, dated 25 March 1949:

a. “That discussion of the points set out in paragraphs 8 to 12³ will not prejudice the security of Anglo-American plans to defend the Middle East.

b. That the information set out in paragraph 17⁴ can be given to the Egyptians as a background for the Anglo-Egyptian defense negotiations.”

2. Although the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agree to points a and b in paragraph 1 above, political, economic, and security considerations compel the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to qualify their views as follows:

a. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are re-evaluating strategic plans in the light of recent international developments. Until this re-evaluation has been completed, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff believe it would be premature for the British Chiefs of Staff to indicate to the Egyptians that facilities or installations are required for use specifically by U.S. forces. Consequently the U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggest that during the course of Anglo-Egyptian discussions regarding requirements, the British Chiefs of Staff identify the requirements for facilities and installations as those to be used by the “United Kingdom and her allies” and not mention the “United States” directly.

b. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff believe it undesirable for the British Chiefs of Staff to indicate to the Egyptians that combined planning will take place in Egypt. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff do not consider it essential for U.S. planners to visit Fayid in order to accomplish Anglo-American planning for the defense of the Middle East. They consider that necessary Staff talks should be held at a point outside Egypt, such as Malta, Cyprus, or Cyrenaica.

c. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff appreciate that it might be necessary for the British Chiefs of Staff to disclose to the Egyptians that the British main base for conducting Middle East operations will be in Egypt. However, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff consider it inadvisable to tell the Egyptians that an Anglo-American main base for conducting these operations will be in Egypt.

d. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff hope that any Anglo-Egyptian discussion of plans concerning Middle East operations will be confined to Anglo-Egyptian interests in the defense of Egypt itself, and that no reference will be made to American interests or participation in plans concerning the Middle East.⁵

1. RDC 5/78, dated March 25, not printed.
2. Below.
3. These paragraphs came under the general heading of “Anglo-American Requirements in Egypt.” They dealt, consecutively, with general considerations, facilities required in peace, facilities required in war, the air defense of Egypt, and “Additional Points for Discussion”.
4. This paragraph dealt with the necessity of providing the Egyptians with certain background information, which, it was maintained, would not prejudice Anglo-American plans for defending the Middle East. The information comprised five points, as follows: (a) Egypt would be defended by keeping Soviet forces outside Egyptian borders; (b) air attack would therefore represent the main threat to Egypt; (c) the main British installations for defending the Middle East would be located in Egypt; (d) in addition to airfields and facilities to defend Egypt from air attack, bomber airfields would be required; (e) it would be necessary for Allied forces other than British forces to be based in Egypt during wartime to conduct operations in the Middle East.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on May 11, approved the recommendation in CFP–4/6 and the same day sent the memorandum in Enclosure A to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in memorandum SM–862–49 (CFP–4/7).