867N.01/9–1349
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Subject: Conversation with Mr. Bevin on the Middle East
Participants: | Mr. Bevin1 |
Mr. Dening2 | |
Mr. Acheson | |
Mr. McGhee | |
Mr. Butterworth3 | |
Ambassador Douglas | |
Ambassador Jessup | |
Mr. Satterthwaite4 |
Bevin opened the discussion on the Middle East with a complaint about Palestine. He said the United Nations appoint commissions which get nowhere and which lead to more and more faits accomplis which cannot be changed. He said this has happened in the matters of Jerusalem, boundaries, and Arab territories. Bevin said he was in favor of Abdullah having that portion of Arab Palestine which he now occupied and if there were no boundaries there was no Palestine. He said the present situation was unsatisfactory and the British were getting nowhere with the carrying out of their Eight Point Program, although we had approved it. McGhee said it was true that we had put forward no U.S. territorial settlement but we had through our representative on the PCC attempted to get both sides to get together. The Arabs want considerable territory, the Israelis do not want to give up any and their position in both territories and refugees are too far apart for hope of settlement in the PCC in the near future. More flexible proposals are needed on both sides if there is to be hope of conciliation. Bevin asked when it would come to a head? Mr. McGhee replied that the present possibilities of the Commission through conciliation had been exhausted. The Economic Commission although somewhat suspect by the Arab States, we nevertheless hope can induce the Arabs to accept refugees for resettlement and the Israelis to accept others for repatriation with offers of economic assistance. If solution to the refugee problem can be found, perhaps normal relations can in time be resumed. We do not think that there is much hope of a territorial settlement at this time. Bevin again said that the Jews make faits accomplis and the Arabs get nothing.
Bevin then said that the British were making progress with Egypt toward an important treaty. The discussions were going along quite well on military, political, and economic levels. But failure to settle the Palestine problem was blocking the whole Egyptian deal. McGhee again said that he thought we had to cope with the problem for a while.
Bevin then discussed the problem of getting oil out of Iraq. He said that what was needed was “running rights” to Haifa. He had in mind a joint board to manage the port of Haifa along the lines of the Port of London Authority. It could be well and impartially run. He thought the Jews could easily grant “running rights” without in any way involving the sovereignty question. This could be done quickly and would start the port running again. Bevin said, as we knew, oil was very important to Iraq and the rights could be given outside of any territorial settlement. Mr. McGhee said the Israelis had talked only about a free zone for Haifa like that at Salonika. Mr. Bevin said a free port would be better than a free zone, which, unless the port were controlled impartially, might not result in the oil and supplies being [Page 1378] loaded. Bevin said he thought the Arabs would take such a deal. Mr. McGhee reminded him that the Arabs had up to now refused to cooperate or even talk with the Israelis. Bevin said that the Regent of Iraq did not reject this idea and he might be tempted to take the opportunity to share in the management of the port. This also might ease the outlet to the Red Sea Problem.
Ambassador Douglas inquired whether territorial settlement involving Abdullah might not complicate the whole Palestine situation. Bevin said that the Gaza strip was not so important. Mr. McGhee said that the other Arab States would probably oppose annexation of the occupied territory to Jordan and that the inhabitants might even oppose it or prefer the Israelis. We agree that Abdullah should eventually get it, but not until a general settlement had been reached. Before that time such action would probably create more problems than it would solve.
Bevin then reiterated his concern regarding the effectiveness of the various Commissions which had been set up. Getting to the refugee problem he said that the British had put up half a million in sterling. Mr. McGhee said we were optimistic for an ultimate solution and would be more so if it were not for the recent revolution in Syria. He said that it seemed possible to take care of nearly all of the refugees if the new Syrian Government would cooperate as Zaim had indicated he was willing to do. Some refugees might be left for a second bite.
Bevin then got another plug in for his Haifa scheme and said that if Haifa problems were settled Iraq might play ball on the refugees. I asked Bevin to explain what he meant by “running rights”. He said that since the territory behind Haifa and Haifa itself are in the hands of the Jews, the Arabs have no truck, rail or pipe line rights to deep water. The Jews are always in the position of stopping the trade at any time. He thought no one would agree to a corridor. I asked him if the problem would be met if “running rights” were granted temporarily for two years. Bevin said he would prefer to do it subject to notice as he thought a fixed period would create a row before the period was ended. Bevin again said he had no faith in the economic development commission or any other commission and that Palestine was still a nightmare to him. I asked Mr. McGhee to try to do something to stir the pot and Bevin said he thought if we could only get one practical thing done, we would be better off than we are now when everything is being frustrated.5
- Mr. Bevin was in the United States to attend the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly, scheduled to meet at New York on September 20.↩
- Maberly E. Dening, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.↩
- W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; on September 29, he became the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.↩
- Livingston L. Satterthwaite, Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.↩
- For the joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom on the Acheson–Bevin conversation, released by the Department of State on September 13, see Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1949, p. 467.↩