Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

secret

Washington, September 3, 1949—2 p. m.

476. Urtel 450, Aug 31.¹ You shld seek early appointment with FonMin and clarify Dept’s position re his views along fol lines:

Establishment of ESM did not stem from action of USG, as FonMin implies. On contrary, ESM was activated by PCC as UN organ, under clear authority granted it by para 12 of Dec 11 res, and after close consultation with SYG of UN. PCC decision was made fol discussions with all dels to PCC and submission Aug 15 of written questionnaire to all dels at Lausanne, informing them re proposed functions and objectives of ESM. Written joint reply to questionnaire received by PCC Aug 29 from Arab dels (reftels being rpted separately for info) clearly indicated approval of ESM’s objectives and readiness recommend that their respective govts extend full support and facilities to ESM. Dept assumes Arab dels kept their respective govts fully informed these official communications. FonMin will doubtless appreciate that, since ESM constitutes sub-body of PCC, Lausanne as seat of commission was logical and convenient place through which to channel official notification this question to dels to PCC.

You shld make special effort to dissipate FonMin’s fears that establishment of ESM implies abandonment by UN or US of political or other functions of PCC. USG deeply hopeful that agreed settlement offering legitimate prospects for long range stability and peace in NE can be obtained, and believes approach through ESM as well as continued efforts on political level essential to achieve such settlement. From point of view of USG, therefore, establishment of ESM constitutes reinforcement of work of conciliation; practical effort to deal on an urgent basis with economic dislocations related to hostilities, of which refugee problem in Lebanon is particularly critical instance; and means of providing PCC with technical info for incorporation into its recommendations to GA for action at autumn session.

In view Leb Govt’s frequently expressed desire for external assistance in economic development, Dept is somewhat surprised over FonMin’s reaction to this concrete step to obtain info on basis of which internatl assistance might be forthcoming. While Dept appreciates FonMin’s candor in discussing ESM with AmLeg, we greatly regret attribution of ulterior motives to US or UN sponsorship thereof. It is Dept’s understanding that “increasingly grave econ conditions” which FonMin stresses are not confined solely to Israel. It is task of ESM to examine these conditions in all countries in area with view to recommending to UN measures for their early improvement.

From point of view of USG, survey mission is by no means instrument designed to force Arab-Israeli cooperation. USG is firmly convinced that solution to econ problems of NE can derive solely from free will and initiative of nations concerned, and certainly not from imposition of any solution or program by UN or its member states. FonMin shld be aware that imposition of any such program or of material assistance required to implement it, is completely contrary to principles and traditions of US.

US rep on PCC and Dept were deeply gratified with cooperative tenor of Arab dels’ reply of Aug 29 with respect to ESM, and feel confident that FonMin’s preliminary reaction constitutes no invalidation of his del’s statements. We appreciate FonMin’s stated willingness receive ESM, but hope Leb Govt will in no way prejudge results of mission’s work and will extend it same cooperation and support which have characterized all Leb’s relations with UN and its organs. On part of USG, we are deeply interested in success of ESM, as means of promoting political settlement and as contribution to econ betterment of NE. As such, USG is prepared to consider carefully such aid as this Govt might properly extend under UN auspices to carry out mission’s recommendations, provided such aid is desired and effectively utilized by states directly concerned.²

Acheson

1. Not printed; it reported that the Lebanese Foreign Minister “made it clear that he has greatest reservation concerning survey’s usefulness and considerable scepticism as to its true objectives.… He stated he believes the real purpose of the mission, although undisclosed, is to provide a means for relieving the increasingly grave economic conditions in Israel; that the timing of the mission could be no ‘coincidence’.… Furthermore, he could not but regard the survey mission as an instrument designed to force the Arab states into economic cooperation with Israel … Foreign Minister also was disturbed by the timing of this survey as he could not but conclude that it would mean an end to any further effective negotiation for political settlement at Lausanne.” (501.BB Palestine/8–3149)
2. This telegram was repeated to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne and to Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, and Tel Aviv. The Department, in a circular telegram of September 3, 1 a. m., to diplomatic officers at each of these posts except Bern, authorized them at their discretion to express the views set forth in telegram 476 in discussions with governments to which they were accredited (501.BB Palestine(E)/9–349).