Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

Editorial Note

In a note of September 1 to the National Security Council, Admiral Souers submitted for the consideration of the Council a draft report by the Secretary of State entitled “United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States.” The note stated in part that the report was “prepared in light of the developments of the past year and in view of the conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in NSC 47 [see page 1009] . . . . The Secretary of State, in transmitting the enclosure, stated that the report was on the present position of the United States not only with respect to Israel but also to the Arab States, with particular reference to the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in Palestine, and that the Department of State is of the opinion that the situation in the Near East is of such a character as to require reference to certain aspects of policy toward the Arab States in defining the United States position toward Israel.” The report is numbered NSC 47/1 (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351).

In a memorandum of September 27 to Mr. Rusk, Max W. Bishop of Mr. Rusk’s staff indicated that portions of NSC 47/1 were not acceptable to the Department of Defense (867N.48/9–2749). After considerable discussion with officers of that Department, informal agreement was reached “to rewrite certain paragraphs in that paper … It would be much appreciated if you could have these revised paragraphs substituted for the corresponding paragraphs in NSC 47/1.” (Mr. Rusk’s letter of September 29 to Admiral Souers, 867N.00/9–2949)

NSC 47/1 is not printed herein, inasmuch as NSC 47/2, which incorporates the revisions, is printed in full on page 1430. There appear below, however, the sections of the earlier paper for which substitutions were made in the later version, as follows:

“[7]c. The technical abilities of the Israelis, coupled with their access to Western technical and financial assistance principally from United States sources, have already resulted in much greater economic opportunities and higher standards of living in Israel than those among the neighboring peoples. In the absence of assistance to the Arab states this disparity will tend to increase in the future and to result in further tensions between Israelis and Arabs. On the other hand, Israel’s program for large-scale economic development, required to implement successfully its ambitious immigration policy, will make it dependent for the foreseeable future upon large-scale external financing through foreign capital investment, loans, and voluntary contributions.

[7]d. Israel’s military establishment, although small by Western standards, has proved itself adequate to resist the poorly equipped, ill-trained and badly led armies of the Arab League states in the course of the recent hostilities and to occupy considerable territory beyond that awarded under the partition plan. In the future, however, the cohesiveness of the Israeli Army, like the government itself, may be affected by pressures from extremist elements. Moreover, so long as Israel continues to be isolated from her neighbors, Israel will be burdened by the high costs and accompanying psychological effect of maintaining a state of military preparedness.

[15]a. The political and economic stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East are of critical importance to the security of the United States.

[15]b. It is in the national interest of the United States to have the respect and, in so far as possible, good will of all the peoples of the Near East, Jews and Arabs alike, and their orientation toward the West and away from the Soviet Union.

[15]d. The foregoing can best be achieved by asserting constructive leadership in the solution of the economic, social, and political problems of the area, and on an impartial basis as between Israel and the Arab states.

City of Jerusalem:

[16]h. We should support the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem. This might be accomplished along the following lines:

(1) United Nations control of the Holy Places;

(2) Division of the city into areas to be administered by the respective adjacent states; and

(3) The establishment of obligations on the part of the adjacent states to observe basic requirements with respect to demilitarization, free access and observance of human rights, and the establishment of a system of compulsory arbitration to determine whether these obligations are being fulfilled.”

Finally, paragraph 21 in NSC 47/1 reads exactly the same as its counterpart in NSC 47/2, except for the substitution of new wording for the last sentence. In the earlier paper, this sentence reads as follows:

“Any US or UN assistance under such a program should be supplementary to but coordinated with such efforts as Israel and the Arab states are able and willing to make to help themselves, should be designed to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between Israel and the Arab states and to integrate their economies into a broader international economy, and should allow ample and increasing scope for private enterprise.”