Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/8–1849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee)¹

secret

[Washington,] August 18, 1949.

Participants:	Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador
	Uriel Heyd, First Secretary, Israeli Embassy
	NEA—Mr. McGhee
	NE—Mr. Wilkins

Problem:

(1) President Truman’s reply² to President Weizmann’s letter of June 24.

(2) Alleged division between White House and State Department.

(3) Developments at Lausanne re Israelis and Arabs.

Action Required:

(1) To transmit summary and full text of President Truman’s reply to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv.

(2) None.

(3) To instruct the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to refute the myth that the PCC and US discouraged direct talks between Israelis and Arabs.

Action Assigned To: NE

Discussion:

The Israeli Ambassador called on me today at my request to discuss various matters relating to Israel and the Arab states. We had a most frank and friendly discussion throughout.

(1) I told the Ambassador that President Truman had replied to President Weizmann’s letter of June 24 and I asked the Ambassador if he would be kind enough to transmit the President’s reply to President Weizmann. As the Ambassador was willing, I handed him a sealed envelope containing the President’s reply. I also handed the Ambassador a copy of the President’s reply for his own informal and confidential information. I pointed out that President Truman’s response should not be made known in any way and that I was providing Mr. Elath with a copy in order to keep him informed of the attitude of the US and because of our confidence in him. Mr. Elath asked me if he could inform the press, whose correspondents even then were waiting in the reception room, that President Truman had replied to President Weizmann’s letter. I said that I thought this inadvisable inasmuch as President Weizmann himself had not yet received the letter and it seemed likely that the press might attach unwarranted significance to a reply at this time. It was, in fact, a coincidence and was not related in any way with Ambassador Porter’s return to Lausanne, Ambassador Elath agreed.

(2) I informed Ambassador Elath of the contents of a recent exchange of messages between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Porter in Lausanne³ with regard to certain information which Mr. Porter reported that Mr. Shiloah had received from Mr. Eban with respect to Arab refugees and territory in Palestine. The Ambassador said that he was uninformed regarding the source at the White House from whom the information reported was obtained, and suggested that the report might be based on a misunderstanding of his own recent interview with President Truman. I told the Ambassador that we were not inferring in any way that his conversation was the basis for this report. I stressed the unity of the White House and the Department regarding recent developments concerning Palestine. At the Ambassador’s request I provided him with paraphrases of copies of the exchange of messages in question.

(3) Ambassador Elath questioned me with respect to Ambassador Porter’s recent consultation with the Department and asked whether any instructions had been given Mr. Porter prior to his return to Lausanne. I replied that Mr. Porter visited Washington on routine consultation. I said that the US as a member of the Conciliation Commission was still pursuing a policy of bringing the parties together on outstanding issues and that we hoped particularly that agreement could be reached regarding refugees and territory. I added that according to reports from Lausanne there appeared to be no real basis for conciliation at the present time because of the widely divergent views held by the Israelis and the Arabs. Our main objectives in the NE are peace and stability. A refugee solution was absolutely necessary. The US as well as other members of the UN was consistently reviewing the general situation to determine whether some new approach might not be devised which would assist the Israelis and Arabs to reach agreement.

The Ambassador replied that in the opinion of his Government agreement was prevented by two important factors:

(1) Direct talks between the Israelis and the Arabs were consistently being discouraged not only by the Conciliation Commission but particularly by the US.

(2) The Arabs did not actually expect refugees to return to Israel and had no territorial demands. It could be seen, therefore, that the US position was more extreme than that of the Arabs.

I told the Ambassador that the US Government was not opposed to direct talks. I said that Mark Ethridge and Paul Porter had strongly urged the parties to negotiate directly. The Arab representatives in Lausanne and elsewhere had, on the other hand, thus far been unwilling to meet the Israelis directly. There were many reasons for this refusal, including such factors as Israeli leaks to the press concerning earlier meetings, and the Arab belief that such meetings if they resulted in concessions might lead to political repercussions in Arab capitals.

I asked the Ambassador in what respect our position in regard to Arabs and territory was more extreme. He replied that we were insisting that Israel repatriate 250,000 refugees and relinquish the Negev. He said Israel could not undertake either of these steps for economic and security reasons. I observed that the Ambassador’s statement in regard to the US position was incorrect. I said we had consistently made it clear that the US was endeavoring to assist the parties and would support any fair reasonable agreement which was freely reached between them.

Regarding refugees, the US had not stated that Israel should repatriate 250,000 refugees. It had pointed out, however, that there were 750,000 refugees and that Israel and the Arab states had primary responsibility for that. Statistical and technical information which is presently available indicated that this total number might be taken care of if the Arab states were able to absorb 500,000 and if Israel were able to repatriate a total of approximately 250,000. On the other hand, actual disposition of the refugees was a matter for determination between the parties and might be handled either directly between them or through the CC.

With respect to territory, I recalled that the US had never expressed a specific territorial proposal and referred in this connection to Dr. Jessup’s statements before the UN on November 20–26, 1948. As was the case with refugees, a settlement of the territorial question was one for determination between the parties either directly or through the Conciliation Commission.⁴

1. Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.
2. Dated August 13, p. 1305.
3. Palun 263, August 3, and Unpal 223, August 9. The former is not printed; but for its substance, see Unpal 223, p. 1291.
4. The Department summarized this memorandum for Tel Aviv in telegram 536, August 19, 8 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/8–949). It then concluded that “In such conversations as you may have with official and unofficial Israelis, you are authorized strongly to follow same line as McGhee re refugees and territory. Dept is particularly concerned that you refute myth re PCC and US discouragement of direct talks between Israelis and Arabs.” No. 536 was repeated to London as No. 2982 and to Paris, Ankara, Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Bern (for Mr. Porter), and New York.