811.2383/2–1749: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
563. Re Deptel 87 Jan 211 Cairo rptd London 234 and various tels from Cairo indicating opinion Brit Emb Cairo that projected visit Fayid several officers Adm Connolly’s staff involved assignments of more than temporary duration Dept informed Emb Cairo and Brit Emb here with concurrence Navy it saw no political objection having some of Conolly’s staff visit GHQ Fayid short period but they shld not be detailed assigned or attached Brit staff in any way. Brit Amb said he wld inform London. Subsequently Emb Cairo reported Brit Emb there had also suggested desirability participation Egyptians in some phases these mil discussions. Both Dept and Adm Conolly strongly opposed such tripartite discussions.2
In view complications arising out foregoing which apparently stemmed in no small degree from extraneous factors injected by Brit Emb Cairo Fayid visit called off and meeting arranged elsewhere but Adm Conolly foresees necessity future talks at Fayid and desires avoid difficulties type described above. Conolly arriving London Feb 21 and will give you full picture. You are authorized following discussion [Page 195] with him take up matter with For Off in order avoid further ambiguities.3
- Not printed, but see second paragraph of Mr. Satterthwaite’s memorandum of January 25, p. 189.↩
- Admiral Conolly and Vice Adm. A. D. Struble, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), conversed with Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and Gordon H. Mattison, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, on February 7. Mr. Mattison’s memorandum covering their conversation (811.2383/2–749) sets forth Admiral Conolly’s suggestion that four points be made to the British. Except for minor changes of language, they were incorporated in the four numbered paragraphs in Secretary Acheson’s letter of April 7 to the Secretary of Defense, p. 203.↩
- This telegram was repeated to Cairo as 181. Admiral Conolly spent one working day (February 21) in London before departing for Tobruk. Part of the day was spent with G. Lewis Jones, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom, and Michael Wright, Superintending Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office. On this occasion, Mr. Wright stressed to Admiral Conolly “the fact that Britain’s primary interest in the Middle East is strategic and that British Foreign Policy in that area is only the handmaiden of British strategic planners.” (letter of February 28 from Mr. Jones to Mr. Satterthwaite, 811.2383/2–2849)↩